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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay investigates what role employee stock
options and CEO compensation have in explaining the surge in corporate share repurchases in
the mid 1990s. Corporations may opt to fund options with repurchased shares to avoid the
immediate dilution of earnings per share. Whether the top executives receive stock-based
compensation may also influence distribution decisions. To test the importance of these two
hypotheses, I collect data on stock option programs for over 800 U. S. corporations at the end of
1994. Estimates suggest that a firm with outstanding options representing 10% of shares
outstanding will repurchase .9 percentage points more stock in 1995, as opposed to a firm with
no option program. Once total outstanding options are controlled for, CEO options and option
holdings of the top five executives are if anything negatively correlated with stock buybacks.
Firms whose CEOs hold options are significantly more likely to retain earnings. The paper also
considers what role the taxation of distributions has in explaining the growth of corporate share
repurchases.
The second essay examines how participant choice in pension plans affects household
portfolios. Some retirement plans allow the participant to choose how funds are invested. Being
exposed to historical differences in asset returns may provide the participant with financial
education which would otherwise not be received. This paper finds that households covered
with pension plans in which the employee must decide upon investments are significantly more
apt to hold stock outside of their retirement plan relative to households with plans offering no
choice.
The third essay investigates the effect of specific features of the U.S. capital gains tax on
turn-of-the-year stock returns. Both the fraction of long-term losses that are deductible from
Adjusted Gross Income and the required holding period for long-term losses have changed over
the past three decades. These changes alter the incentives for year-end capital loss realization for
individual investors. This paper presents evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
detailed provisions of the capital gains tax affect the link between past capital losses and turn-of-
the-year stock returns.
This thesis is dedicated to Jim Weisbenner, whose hard work at "Backache Acres" instilled in
me the work ethic and drive which ultimately carried me from the henhouse to MIT. Not bad for
someone from Hurricane Corners, eh Jim?
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ESSAY ONE
Corporate Share Repurchases in the mid 1990s:
What Role do Stock Options Play?
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was carried out using the NBER Asset-Pricing database.
Prior to the 1980s, distributions to shareholders were almost exclusively through
dividends. The past two decades have seen a dramatic change in corporate payout policy, as
firms are increasingly using share repurchases to distribute cash. For the S & P 500, share
repurchases have grown from 10% to 75% of cash dividends on common stock from 1977-1996.
The trend is likely to continue, as American companies announced intentions to buy back over
$220 billion in shares from January 1997 through April 1998 (The Economist, April 25, 1998).
This begs the following questions: What has caused this change in corporate policy?
Why are firms doing so much repurchasing of their stock in the 1990s? This has long been a
puzzle in both public and corporate finance. Previous work has focussed on such motivations as
takeover deterrence and signaling/market undervaluation in explaining the emergence of
corporate share repurchases.' While surely relevant in some circumstances, they are unlikely to
fully explain the doubling of stock buybacks from 1994-96.
Taxes have traditionally been advanced as a reason that firms would want to repurchase
their own stock. Cash distributions made via share repurchases are tax advantaged relative to
dividend payments for individual investors (Bagwell & Shoven (1989)). Perhaps the emergence
and growth of stock buybacks is a result of firms learning how to minimize the tax burden of
their shareholders. However, when the difference between the tax on dividends and capital gains
was significantly reduced in the mid 1980s, share repurchases continued to grow. Further, the
surge in stock buybacks in the mid 1990s occurred in a relatively stable tax environment. Thus,
an alternative explanation for recent trends in corporate payout policy is needed.
1 Examples include Dann (1981), Verniaelen (1981), Asquith & Mullins (1986), and Comment & Jarrell (1991) on
asymmetric information and signaling, and Denis (1990) and Bagwell (1991) on takeover threats. Ikenberry,
Lakonishok, & Vcrmaelen (1995) and Stephens & Weisbach (1998) present evidence that recent price performance
plays a role in the repurchase decision.
This paper investigates what role stock option programs and the form of CEO
compensation have in explaining the recent surge in repurchases. The total number of
outstanding options and shares available for future option grants has grown over 80% (when
weighted by market value) from 1985-1996 for NYSE and S & P 500 corporations and over 50%
since 1990 (Compustat). Hall & Liebman (1998) document the dramatic growth in CEO's stock-
based compensation which has also occurred the last decade. CEOs of the largest corporations
now receive stock option awards which are larger on average than annual cash compensation,
whereas in 1980 the median stock option award was zero. Clearly, the growth in option
programs could potentially be connected with the surge in share repurchases. The question is
why?
In many circumstances, the corporation may have an incentive to repurchase stock to
fund option programs. The firm has a choice as to how it will satisfy exercised options. It can
simply issue new shares when options are exercised, thus diluting current shareholders'
ownership of the firm. In order to avoid dilution, the firm can repurchase and then re-issue the
stock necessary to satisfy the option program. However, that will lower cash available for other
projects.
One would expect the decision of how to pay for options to be solely motivated by
economic considerations. For example, ceteris paribus, firms with good investment
opportunities opt to use cash flow for investment as opposed to repurchasing shares for option
programs, and firms with poor marginal investment opportunities opt to use excess cash to
repurchase stock and avoid share dilution.
However, accounting practices may provide an incentive for firms to use share buybacks.
Issuing new shares will immediately dilute such measures as earnings per share which are widely
used to evaluate firm performance. In this case, the cost of the option program is apparent. Now
suppose exercised options are fulfilled by repurchasing stock. Cash used for a repurchase to
fund an option program is not subtracted out of income from operations, thus not affecting
current earnings per share. Using cash flow to finance the purchase of stock, rather than for
other purposes, will supposedly lower future earnings, but the effects are only felt down the road.
The real costs firms are incurring from the past grants of options are not as directly apparent. As
Gretchen Morgenstern concludes (Forbes, May 18, 1998), "Though the options don't count as
cost, they are a mortgage on future earnings."" And share repurchases are referred to as "a pure
earnings management scheme" by Charles Clough, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch
(The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1999).
Funding option programs through share repurchase as opposed to diluting the number of
shares outstanding may, at least temporarily, obfuscate the real cost of option programs to the
naive investor. I'll refer to this motivation to avoid share dilution as the "funding hypothesis".
Two recent papers (Jolls (1998) and Fenn & Liang (1999)) have suggested an alternative
explanation for the growth in share repurchases which focuses on the form of CEO compensation
and agency problems (hereafter referred to as the "agency hypothesis"). The popular press also
cites CEO compensation as a cause of the trend in corporate payout policy (The Economist, April
25, 1998 and Business Week, April 21,1997). A CEO with stock options has an incentive to
purchase shares as opposed to paying dividends, even when that is not the preference of
shareholders. A dividend payment will reduce the stock price and the value of outstanding
2 A 1993 survey by the Hay Group, Inc. reports that 23% of surveyed corporations base annual bonuses at least in
part on earnings per share. Thus, in some firms, CEOs may have a more personal incentive to manipulate earnings
options whereas a share repurchase will not, ceteris paribus. 3 Thus, distribution decisions of the
firm will not solely reflect shareholder preference but will also depend on how the wealth of the
person making those decisions is impacted. However, from the CEO's perspective, retention of
earnings may be preferred to share buybacks, especially when the firm has good investment
opportunities or the market may be driven by "irrational exuberance".
The "funding" hypothesis (avoid share dilution) and "agency" hypothesis (CEOs
manipulate distributions to maximize value of own options) will give different predictions for a
firm's payout policy based on the size of a firm's option program and the CEO's option
holdings. It is important to note that there is variation across firms in the extent to which
"optionization" extends below the CEO. At the end of 1994, such S & P 500 firms as Microsoft,
Dell Computers, Shared Medical Systems, and Merck had large, broad-based option programs in
which the CEO held less than .6% of options outstanding. At the other end of the spectrum, the
CEOs of Reebok, Gateway, and Black & Decker held 35% or more of their company's
outstanding options. Thus, it is possible to test if the link between option programs and share
repurchases is driven by the tension between firm value maximization and CEO wealth
maximization, or instead reflects a more widespread funding of option programs with
repurchased shares.
To empirically test what is driving the relationship between share repurchases and
options, I use a data set of over 800 firms. The data set was created by merging together data
per share. Healey (1985) and Holthausen, Larker, and Sloan (1995) present evidence that executives manipulate
reported earnings so as to maximize the value of bonus plan payments.
3 Essentially no firms offer dividend-protected stock options. That means any dividends paid on a stock will not be
paid out to those holding options on that stock. In a sample of 827 firms at the end of 1994, I find only two which
mention in their proxy statement that they offer dividend-protected options. For these two corporations, dividend
payments accrue in an optionee's account until the stock option is exercised.
from annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements filed with the SEC at the end of fiscal year
1994 with the Compustat database. Unlike earlier work, I have accurate measures of firm
financial behavior, the size of the option program, and the option holdings of the CEO. The
sample represents nearly 2/3 of NYSE market value and 90% of share repurchases in 1995.
Two links between option programs and distribution policy emerge in the sample. Firms
in general opt to fund option programs with repurchased shares to avoid dilution. However, after
controlling for the effect of total options, the larger is the CEOs holding of outstanding options,
the more apt the firm is to retain earnings and curtail cash distributions.
Estimates suggest that a 10% point increase in outstanding options (normalized by shares
outstanding) is associated with roughly a .9% point increase in repurchases (normalized by
assets) in 1995 and a 1.7% point increase in repurchases in 1995-96. (the average share
repurchase payout rate for the whole sample is 1.6% in 1995 and 4. 1% in 1995-96). CEO option
holdings are if anything negatively correlated with the decision to buy back stock. In other
words, a desire to fund option programs with repurchased shares, as opposed to issuing new
equity, appears to be a strong driving force behind the surge in share repurchases.
Where the form of CEO compensation may matter is in the retention of earnings
decision. An increase of a CEO's outstanding options by 1% point is associated with an
estimated increase in the retention rate over the next two years of 3-4% points. 4 This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that the distribution decision of a firm is impacted by CEO option
holdings.
These results are of interest because they bear on such issues as the interplay between
accounting practices and economic behavior, agency problems and the impact on firm
4 The retention rate is defined as I - (dividends and repurchases in 1995 & 1996)/(income before extraordinary
items in 1995 & 1996).
distribution decisions, and future trends in corporate distributions. Funding stock option
programs through re-issuing repurchased shares as opposed to diluting existing shares may make
it more difficult for analysts to observe the ultimate cost of stock-based compensation to the
firm. The most important question raised by this paper is to what extent does the market
capitalize the cost of stock-based compensation into share prices?
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews aggregate trends in
corporate cash distributions and the emergence of share repurchases. It also discusses the tax
motivation for share repurchases and documents the time series relationship between cash
distributions and tax rates. The remainder of the paper focuses on the interplay between stock
options, CEO compensation, and firm payout policy. Section 2 discusses the growth of
employee stock option programs and the form of CEO compensation over the past decade.
Previous work and hypotheses concerning the link between stock options and share repurchases
are also discussed. Details on the data set constructed to test how and why option programs are
funded is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 presents and analyzes empirical results and
conducts robustness checks. Multiple estimation strategies are employed to test the consistency
of the results. Section 4 also tests whether the tax motivation for share repurchases fairs any
better in the cross-section than it does in the time series. Trends in stock option exercises for
S & P 100 and Dow Jones firms are documented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
I. Trends in Firm Payout Policy and Tax Rates 1977-1996
Changes in corporate cash distributions over the past two decades has been well
documented (sources include Bagwell & Shoven (1989), Dittmar (1997), and Jagannathan, et al.
(1998)). Therefore, after describing the data used, I will only briefly discuss the aggregate
numbers. I also review how well trends in payouts match changes in tax rates on dividend and
capital gain income faced by shareholders.
1.1 Data Description
The sample consists of all publicly traded industrial firms reported on the 1997
Compustat Industrial and Industrial Research file, which provide fiscal year accounting data over
1977-1996. I exclude companies for which Compustat does not report the purchase of stock
(commercial banks, life insurance, and casualty and property companies).
Dividends are simply cash dividends declared on common stock (data item A21).
Compustat reports dollars spent on repurchases of the firm's own securities (data item A 115),
which is obtained from the firm's Flow of Funds Statement. It does not include purchases of
stock in other companies. 5
Data item A 108 reports the sale of common and preferred stock as recorded on the Flow
of Funds Statement. Again, I net out any increases in preferred stock par value. The adjustment
reduces aggregate sales by roughly 10-20%. This measure will understate the true dollar value
of common stock issued by the firm because stock options are often exercised at a substantial
discount from the market price.
5 This measure overestimates the amount of repurchases of common stock because it aggregates all of the
following: (1) conversion of Class A, Class B, special stock, etc., into common stock, (2) conversion of preferred
stock into common stock, (3) purchase of treasury stock, (4) retirement or redemption of common/ordinary stock,
(5) retirement or redemption of preferred stock, and (6) retirement or redemption or redeemable preferred stock. I
subtract any decreases in the par value of preferred stock (data item Al 30) from this repurchase measure so it is
more reflective of buyback of common stock. This adjustment reduces aggregate share repurchases by roughly
10%. Discussions with Doug Malcolm and Kelly Lampe at Compustat indicate the following adjustment should lead
to an accurate measurement of the cost of acquiring common stock.
Finally, I also report net share repurchases (defined as dollars spent on repurchases less
dollars received from the sale of stock) for those firms which repurchase shares. This will
indicate to what extent share buybacks represent true equity shrink, or if the shares are instead
re-issued at high frequency.
1.2 Firm Payout Policy
Table I reports the aggregate total of share repurchases, dividends, sale of stock, and net
repurchases (defined as dollars spent on repurchases less dollars received form sale of stock for
repurchasing firms and zero otherwise) for S & P 500 firms. A more detailed analysis of share
buybacks for NYSE and S & P 500 firms is presented in Table 2.
A few themes emerge which will set the stage for the rest of the paper. While aggregate
dividends normalized by market value have fallen by roughly 50% over the past two decades,
share repurchase payout rates have more than quadrupled in aggregate (see Figure 1 at the end of
the paper after the tables). If the trend continue, S & P 500 firms will consistently distribute
more cash to shareholders via share buybacks as opposed to dividends. The proportion of firms
buying back more than 1% of their equity has doubled over the past 15 years, with much of the
change occurring in the mid 1980s.6 Particularly striking is the surge in share buybacks in the
6 A natural question to ask is why did corporations start to buyback shares in the early to mid 1980s? Prior to 1982,
ambiguity existed in the law as to whether firms repurchasing shares on the open market would be charged with
price manipulation. SEC Rule 10b-18, enacted in November 1982, provides cover for firms wishing to repurchase
shares without being charged with price manipulation under provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act. The
rule requires: (1) trades are made through one broker, (2) none of the trades are made as the opening transaction of
the day or during the last half hour of the trading day, (3) none of the trades may be completed at a price exceeding
the highest current independent bid price or the last independent sale price, whichever is higher, and (4) the total of
such purchases in a day may not exceed 25% of the average daily trading volume for the preceding four weeks. The
public announcement of a firm's intention to repurchase shares on the open market is another "safe harbor"
provision. The rule clearly had an effect as evidenced in the time series as well as the number of open market
repurchases. This discussion draws heavily from Ikenberry & Vermaelen (1996).
mid 1980s and the mid 1990s. Also, share repurchases are dominated by the mature, established
firms.
Perhaps surprisingly, a number of firms are acting on both the share repurchase and
issuance margin. The funding of option programs is undoubtedly one of the explanations for this
puzzle. While corporations are buying back shares in record numbers, it is also worth noting that
many of the shares are being re-issued. For example, when weighted by market value, 53% of
NYSE and S & P 500 firms which repurchased more than 1% of their equity in 1996 also had
stock sales in 1996 in excess of .05% of their market value. Given that the exercise price of
stock sold to optionees is often significantly below the current market price the firm pays when
repurchasing its stock, this suggests a substantial recycling of repurchased stock. Further, shares
outstanding actually increased for about 1 in 4 of these repurchasers in 1996.
1.3 Payout Policy and Tax Rates
When a corporation distributes earnings via a dividend payment, the full amount of the
dividend is taxed at the ordinary income tax rate for individual shareholders. If the corporation
instead repurchases stock, non-tendering shareholders will receive capital gains which can be
deferred (see Bagwell & Shoven (1989)). One might suspect this tax differential is driving
trends in payout policy. Table 3, taken from Poterba (1998), reports weighted average marginal
tax rates on dividend income and accruing capital gains in the U. S. over the past 20 years.7 The
average tax rate changes as the distribution of stock across different groups with different
marginal tax rates changes.
7 The accruing capital gains tax rate is calculated under the assumption that the top statutory tax rate on capital
gains for individuals is reduced by half on account of capital gains deferral and half again because some gains
escape taxation through basis-step up at death.
The fall in statutory dividend tax rates on households in the 1980s, coupled with the rise
of equity ownership by pension plans, has substantially reduced the average tax rate on
dividends. The difference between the tax rate on dividends and that on accruing capital gains
has fallen from 23 percentage points in 1980 to 10-11 percentage points in the 1990s. It should
rise slightly under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the time series in not too supportive of a tax motivation. The tax
advantage of capital gains over dividend income was large when share repurchases emerged in
the early 80s. However, when the difference between the tax on dividends and capital gains was
significantly reduced in the mid 1980s, share repurchases continued to grow. Further, the
differential between the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains has been flat in the mid
1990s, when corporations started to buy back stock in record numbers.
Also, direct individual ownership of corporate equity was falling in the mid 1980s and
mid 1990s at the same time share repurchases were increasing (see last column of Table 3).
Individuals, as opposed to nonprofits or corporations, receive the biggest tax advantage from
cash distributions made by share repurchases. 8
Based on the time series alone, it is difficult to come away with any link between taxes
and distributions.9 If tax considerations don't appear to be driving the surge in stock buybacks,
what is? The paper will now consider the emergence of employee stock option programs and the
changing structure of CEO compensation.
8 Direct individual ownership excludes ownership through pension plans and mutual funds. See Dickson and
Shoven (1995) for a discussion of to what extent mutual fund managers take into account the tax liability of their
investors. Corporations currently pay tax on only 30% of dividends, but 100% of realized capital gains.
9 While the difference between the taxation of dividends and accruing capital gains has diminished, it is still over 10
percentage points. Perhaps the emergence and growth of stock buybacks are a result of firms gradually learning
II. Payout Policy, Option Programs, and CEO Compensation
At the same time corporations are buying back shares with regularity after the recession
of the early 1990s, corporations are issuing stock options to their employees in record numbers.
The goal of the rest of this paper is to empirically disentangle what is really driving the
connection between options and share repurchases in the mid 1990s and what the implications
are for future policy.
I first document the growth of stock option programs over the past decade. I then discuss
previous work in this area, with the key paper being Jolls (1998), and outline the "funding"
hypothesis. The magnitude of the liability stock options represent is presented at the end of this
section. I describe the data set collected on stock option programs and CEO compensation and
conduct the empirical tests in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
2.1 Stock Option Programs
Table 4 displays the growth over the past decade of option programs. Shares reserved for
outstanding options and authorized for future grants has grown by 60% (unweighted sample) to
80% (weighted by market value) for NYSE and S & P 500 firms over 1985-96.1o The ratio of
reacquired shares stored in Treasury to shares reserved for options is zero for many firms. This
how to minimize the tax burden of their shareholders. I later test for cross-sectional evidence of a correlation
between firm distributions and direct individual ownership of the firm.
to This measure overstates outstanding options, which Compustat does not report, since it also includes the number
of shares available for future grants under existing plans. The correlation of shares reserved for options with
outstanding options was .88 and the median ratio of total outstanding options to total shares reserved for options was
.7 in a sample of 827 firms at the end of 1994 I constructed.
suggests that if there is a reluctance on the part of firms to dilute outstanding shares, share
buybacks should continue to trend upward in the foreseeable future.
For example, it is interesting that the aggregate doubling of share buybacks for the S & P
500 from 1994-1996 corresponded to a time when the number of shares held in Treasury relative
to the number of outstanding options (let's refer to this as the funding ratio) had fallen
dramatically for large corporations. The funding ratio (weighted by market value) was .21 at the
beginning of 1993, but had fallen to .02 at the beginning of 1995 (perhaps due to the exercise of
options). At the beginning of 1996, the number of shares held in Treasury represented about 1/8
of the number of outstanding options for large firms (1/8 is the median ratio weighted by market
value). Given the growth in option programs, and the relatively small amount of re-acquired
shares held in Treasury, firms will be faced with the dilemma of either buying back shares in
large quantities or allowing share dilution.
2.2 Previous Work
Most research concerning stock options focuses on the correlation between CEO
compensation and firm performance and/or the presence of agency problems (recent examples
include Yermack (1995), Hall & Liebman (1998), and Hall (1998)). The accounting literature
focuses on whether the standard accounting of employee stock options permits them to be used
as an income management strategy (Matsunaga (1995)), or whether the difference between the
corporate and top individual tax rate influences the type of option granted to employees (Balsam,
et al. (1997)). Most in spirit with this paper, Jolls (1998) and Fenn & Liang (1999), investigate
to what extent options influence the composition of cash distributions by the firm.
Jolls (1998) suggests that the incentives of the agents who run firms, determined by the
CEO's compensation package, can explain repurchase behavior. This is the agency hypothesis.
While stock-based compensation for CEOs in the largest U.S. corporations was not widespread
in the 1980s, the value of the average stock option grant now exceeds the average CEO cash
salary (Hall & Liebman (1998)). Table 5 demonstrates that while annual cash based
compensation for executives at large U. S. corporations has grown about 50% in real terms from
1985-94, the median value of option grants has almost doubled from just 1991-94." I
Jolls presents an optimal payout decision rule for CEOs, derived from a managerial
objective function which places weight both on the value to shareholders and to the manger.
Why should the CEO care about the composition of cash distributions of the firm? As was just
mentioned, the portion of CEO compensation which is in the form of stock options has increased
dramatically. An option gives the optionee the right to purchase stock at a set price over a
certain period of time. However, firms very rarely offer dividend-protected stock options.' 2
That means any dividends paid on a stock will not be paid out to those holding options on that
stock. While conventional dividends will dilute the per-share value of stock, a share repurchase
will not.
An example should clarify how the composition of distributions impacts the value of
outstanding options. For example, let's assume a firm's market value is $1000 and there are 20
shareholders, thus the price per share is $50. If a firm pays a dividend of $5 per share, or $ 1A00 in
aggregate, that will lower the price per share to $45 (ignoring any signaling effect of the
distribution). Thus, the market value of stock underlying options has fallen 10%.
Now suppose the firm instead returns the $100 to shareholders by buying back stock.
The $100 can by two shares. After the repurchase, the firm value is $900, there are now 18
" I thank Brian Hall, with assistance from Ali Ashan, for providing me with the data used to construct this table.
shares of stock outstanding and the price per share is still $50 (again ignoring signaling or other
effects). The value of outstanding options is unaffected by the repurchase because share price is
unaffected. Thus, ceteris paribus, CEOs will have an incentive to substitute share repurchases
for dividend payments if they have outstanding stock options.
To test this hypothesis, Jolls collects a sample of firms announcing share repurchases or
dividend increases in the Wall Street Journal, and compares them to a random sample of firms
that did not announce a repurchase of dividend increase in 1993.13 She concludes that firms
which rely heavily on stock options to compensate their top executives are more apt to
repurchase stock. This work has been influential because it links together two current topics in
corporate finance, share repurchases and the "optionization" of CEO compensation. It also
suggests that the fcrm of CEO compensation can induce agency problems which ultimately
impact the distribution decisions of firms. Further, the work has attracted the attention of the
popular press (The Economist, April 25, 1998).
Fenn & Liang (1999) investigate motivations for corporate payout policy. They present
evidence that management options is positively correlated with share repurchases and negatively
correlated with dividend payments for a sample of 1100 nonfinancial firms over 1993 - 1997.
They interpret this evidence as suggesting substitution of share repurchases for dividends, and
12 In a sample of 827 firms at the end of 1994, I find two which mention in their proxy statement that they offer
dividend-protected options. Dividend payments accrue in an optionee's account until the stock option is exercised
for these two firms.
13 Using share repurchase announcements as opposed to actual distributions can lead to a misclassification of firms.
Repurchase programs following an announcement are generally conducted over many years (Stephens & Weisbach
(1998)), so many firms repurchasing stock in year t would not have made an announcement in year t. Usem,
Schulman, & Brown (1995) and Stephens & Weisbach (1998) document that a nontrivial number of firms do not
follow through on share repurchase announcements.
conclude, as Jolls does, that the repurchase decision is driven by the compensation of upper
management.
2.3 Alternative Explanation for Link Between Share Repurchases and Stock Options
This paper argues that it is not the form of CEO compensation, but rather a desire to
avoid dilution of shares outstanding and such accounting measures as earnings per share which is
responsible for the surge in share repurchases in recent years (funding hypothesis). Charles
Clough, chief investment strategist at Merrill Lynch, refers to stock buybacks as "a pure earnings
management scheme" (The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1999). A potentially serious
drawback of previous work is its inability to empirically differentiate between the impact of total
options and CEO options upon payout policy.14 It is worth stating the obvious: CEO
outstanding options is the product of total options outstanding and the percent of those options
held by the CEO. It is important to establish which component is driving the link between stock
options and payout policy.
From a fully informed shareholder's perspective, whether the firm issues new equity or
repurchases and then re-issues shares when options are exercised should depend upon the
marginal investment opportunities of the firm (proxied for by Tobin's q). Suppose there are two
shares outstanding in a firm valued at $100, thus the price per share is $50. Suppose a worker is
issued an option to purchase a share of stock at $20. If the firm issues new equity when the
option is exercised, there will now be three shares outstanding, and cash on hand will increase by
$20 (the exercise price paid by the optionee). Thus, the original shareholder's stake in the
14 Jolls considers this alternative, but dismisses it. Jolls uses total grants of options during the year as a proxy for
outstanding options, and finds it has little explanatory power. However, most options become exercisable or vest
gradually over a three to five year period and do not expire for up to ten years. Thus, the correlation between
repurchases and grants will be substantially lower than that for actual outstanding options if the firm is motivated to
buy back stock to fund an option program.
corporation is diluted. Now, suppose that when the option is exercised, the firm decides to buy
back one share to undo the dilution. If the firm repurchases one share for $40, there will now
only be two shares outstanding after the option is exercised, but the firm's cash on hand will be
reduced by $20 ($40 repurchase cost less $20 exercise price).
How should the firm fund the option program? If the firm's marginal q is one (the return
to capital inside vs. outside the firm is the same), the shareholder shouldn't care. The firm value
is either $120 with three outstanding shares, or $80 with two outstanding shares. Suppose a firm
can earn a substantially higher return from additional investment relative to the return on capital
outside the firm (q > 1). In this case, funding option programs through buybacks is particularly
costly. The firm would be better off by allowing share dilution to occur when options are
exercised and utilizing the cash that would have been used to repurchase stock to increase
investment.
As mentioned in the introduction, firms may have an incentive to buy back stock to fund
option programs, regardless of how the CEO is compensated. Issuing new shares will
immediately dilute such accounting measures as earnings per share which is commonly used to
evaluate firm performance. Funding exercised options with repurchased stock will not impact
operating income or outstanding shares for the current period. Presumably, using cash to
repurchase stock rather than for other uses will gradually lower future earnings, but the effects
will be felt down the road. Matsunaga (1995) presents evidence that firm's that use income
increasing measures such as how depreciation is expensed and how inventory is valued are also
more apt to grant stock options. Further, work by Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larker, and
Sloan (1995) demonstrate how reported earnings are manipulated depending upon the incentives
of the firm and its executives. The key question is how well does the "market" sort through this
accounting information.
A few years ago, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), attempted to come
up with a standard that would require companies to make explicit future option costs, and realize
the cost against current earnings.'" Not surprisingly, the proposal met fierce opposition from
corporate America and was killed at the end of 1994. As Dennis Beresford, chairman of the
FASB from 1987-97 recalled, "The argument was: reduced earnings would translate to reduced
stock prices. People said to me, 'If we have to record a reduction in income by 40%, our stock
will go down by 40%, our options will be worthless we won't be able to keep employees. It
would destroy all American business and Western civilization"' (Forbes, May 18, 1998).
As a compromise, FASB rule 123 requires firms (starting in 1996) to disclose in a
footnote the impact upon earnings if the fair value of stock options were counted as an expense,
with the cost divided equally across the vesting period of the option grants. However, the
usefulness of this provision is suspect given investors have to search through footnotes at the end
of annual reports to find the data, the data is not presented in the section where income and
earnings per share are presented, and the way firms value options may differ across firms.
Further, the pro forma effect on net income reported in the footnote the past few years is not
representative of the pro forma effect on earnings in future years because the rule 123 method of
accounting for compensation expense is not applied to options granted prior to 1995 which have
yet to vest.
The clever analyst may be able to uncover the liability outstanding options represent.
However, prior to 1996, many firms only reported options outstanding and the minimum and
15 See Dechow, et al. (1996) and Revise, Collins, & Johnson (1999) for a discussion of the political economy
surrounding the recommendation by FASB that options be recognized as an expense.
maximum exercise prices for those options in their annual report. 16 The typical shareholder or
naive analyst may not make appropriate corrections to earnings to account for stock-based
compensation. Byron White, U. S. investment strategist at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
concludes (The Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1998) "I think this whole area [stock options] is
more serious than is being treated by analysts."
The debate surrounding the ultimate demise of recommendations that firms explicitly
account for the cost of option programs in earnings, as they do cash based compensation,
suggests that firms may feel the market has not fully capitalized the cost of option programs into
share prices. 17 Recent studies by Bears & Stearns and Smithers & Co. suggests that explicitly
accounting for the cost of options would substantially reduce measures of firm earnings,
particularly in the technology sectors.18 Smithers & Co. reported "It has proved far more
difficult and time consuming then we had expected to obtain the data needed to make the
calculations in the report. ... We set out to obtain information on all the 200 largest listed U. S.
companies but the difficulties in obtaining the data led us to publish when we had 100 of them."
Perhaps no firm is more synonymous with the use of stock options than Microsoft. At
the end of fiscal year 1994, Microsoft had outstanding options representing 20% of current
shares outstanding. None of these were held by the CEO Bill Gates, and only a small fraction of
these were held by the top five executive officers (.5%). Here is what Microsoft describes as the
16 Starting in 1996, corporations disclose the average exercise price for outstanding options in their 10-Ks.
17 Another concern in the debate was how to fairly value the option grant.
18 Bear Stearns found that deducting the value of current option grants would lower the 1997 reported earnings of
the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 56 high-tech companies in the technology sector of the S & P
500 index on average by 10%. Smithers & Co., looking at 100 large U.S. companies in 1995 and 1996, concluded
properly accounting for options would have reduced reported net income by 34%. The disparity arises because the
Smithers & Co. report deducts the change in the value of previously granted options during the year from income,
whereas Bear Stearns did not. The value of previously granted options rises as the stock price increases.
purpose of its share repurchase program, taken from its Quarterly Report to Shareholders (10-Q
filing) on March 31, 1997:
Management believes existing cash and short-term investments together with funds generated from operations will
be sufficient to meet operating requirements for the next twelve months. Microsoft's cash and short-term
investments are available for strategic investments, mergers and acquisitions, and to fund an increased stock
buyback program over historical levels to reduce the dilutive impact of the Company's employee stock option and
purchase programs.
Of course there is a cost to funding option programs by repurchasing shares as well (everyone
owns the same fraction of a smaller pie), but the cost may not be as transparent to shareholders
and the market.
Jolls' work makes the point that the distribution policy of firms may be influenced by the
resulting impact on the wealth of the person making that decision. The argument above does not
state that this is unreasonable. Indeed, the argument is very sensible. However, I would argue
that if the "optionization" of CEO compensation impacts firm payout policy, it would likely be
through increasing retention of earnings. Dividend payments reduce price per share and hence
the value of options. Given that Tobin's q for most firms is very high, internal investment of
funds may be the most profitable use of funds. A CEO acting solely to maximize the value of
option holdings would likely prefer retentions to repurchasing stock at historically high prices or
increasing dividends.
Finally, Bagwell (1992) and Shleifer (1986) provide another rationale for managers to
avoid share dilution. Classical theory suggests that the firm has a fundamental value which
shouldn't be a function of the number of shares in the firm or who holds those shares. However,
Bagwell (1992) and Shleifer (1986) provide evidence of a non-flat supply curve by studying
price responses to Dutch auction share repurchases and the inclusion of firms into the S & P 500,
respectively. This suggests firm value may be affected by the supply of shares and/or who owns
the shares. Perhaps repurchasing of shares on the open market from outsiders and transferring of
them to insiders (employees) may also have the effect of replacing shareholders with the lowest
valuation of the firm with new shareholders with a higher valuation of the firm, thus potentially
increasing share price.
2.4 Magnitude of Liability Stock Options Represent
To put in perspective the magnitude of the liability stock-based compensation represents,
data was collected for all the non-bank and utility members of the S & P 100 and Dow Jones
Industrial and the members of the S & P 500 Technology Sector at the end of 1997. Nearly all
the firms provided the average exercise price for exercisable outstanding options and the average
remaining life on outstanding options along with the expected dividend payment and price
volatility of the stock (131 of 142 firms). Using this information, I calculate both the "in-the-
money" value of the exercisable options (market price less average exercise price) and also use
the average remaining life for all outstanding options, the stock volatility, and the dividend
payout rate to calculate a value of the options based on the Black-Scholes formula.19 For this
group of 131 firms, exercisable options had an in-the-money value of $66.5 billion (44% of 1997
earnings) and a value of $158 billion (105% of 1997 earnings) using the Black-Scholes formula.
Thus, stock based compensation represents a non-trivial liability for firms.
19 My measure understates the true in-the-money value of exercisable options because options with an exercise
price above the current market price are included in the average exercise price. Also, my Black-Scholes calculation
assigns the average remaining life and average exercise price to all outstanding options, and assumes a risk-free rate
of 5.18% (the six-month Treasury bill rate).
Table 6 presents stock option exercises, dilution, and share repurchases for the nine
members of the S & P 100 and Dow Jones Industrial which had stock option exercises form
1993-97 in excess of 10% of shares outstanding. While firms such as Cisco Systems and
Computer Sciences Corporation allow dilution to occur when stock options are exercised, other
firms, such as Monsanto and the Aluminum Company of America, fully fund their option
program with repurchased shares. However, avoiding share dilution comes at a substantial cost.
Cash spent on share repurchases 1993-97, is over 50% of earnings for the Aluminum Company
of America and over 40% of earnings for Monsanto.
Table 7 presents more specific detail for Microsoft. Microsoft has adopted a strategy to
at least partially avoid sha:e dilution, as 55% of options exercised between 1993-97 were funded
by share repurchases. Without the repurchases, share dilution over the period would have been
21.4% as opposed to the actual 10.7%. Cash spent on share repurchases, less cash received from
optionees when options are exercised, was over 40% of earnings from 1993-97, and was 70% of
earnings in 1997!
Perhaps the future cost of option grants made in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
capitalized into the stock price at that time, and the market is already expecting these cash flows
to occur. However, the dollars spent on repurchases will only start to impact earnings down the
road, by absorbing cash flow that could be used for other projects which yield future payoffs.
This is of particular concern in the years to come as the increased granting of options today will
lead to an increased exercise of options tomorrow.
Section 3 will describe the data set I have constructed to determine what is driving the
link between repurchases and options. Unlike earlier work in this area, I have collected data on
both total options outstanding and CEO option holdings. I also have data on actual dollars spent
buying back stock as opposed to share repurchase announcements. I will test for both evidence
of the agency hypothesis developed by Jolls and the funding hypothesis just described in Section
4.
III. Data on CEO Compensation and Option Programs
Prior to 1992, this analysis would not be possible. In 1992 the SEC expanded disclosure
requirements regarding option programs. Since then, proxy statements list outstanding options
of the most highly paid executive officers. The annual report to shareholders (ARS) and 10-K
filings provide information on the balance of option programs, including grants during the year,
outstanding options at the end of the year, and shares available for future grants under existing
stock compensation plans. Relevant data was collected for firms at the end of fiscal year 1994
from the Laser D SEC database which contains proxy statements, annual reports, and 10-Ks filed
by U. S. corporations. The 1997 Compustat database details financial activities of corporations.
The sample consists of all publicly traded companies which were a member of the S & P
500 or the MidCap 400 at the end of 1994, or are included in one of the May 1995 Forbes 500
lists (sales, profits, assets, and/or market value), with the following exceptions. Corporations in
highly regulated industries, such as banks (SIC two-digit industry 60) and utilities (SIC two-digit
industry 49) are excluded. Firms which do not have data in Compustat in 1995 or undergo a
significant merger are dropped, as are firms for which data on CEO options and/or total
outstanding options is not available either through the annual report or the proxy statement.
Finally, I also require that institutional ownership of the corporation at the end of 1994 is
available. The remaining sample consists of 827 firms, which in aggregate represent nearly 2/3
of the capitalization of the NYSE and 90% of repurchases of NYSE firms.
Tables 8 summarizes the option programs and CEO compensation, direct individual
ownership, and distribution policy of the 827 firms. Other characteristics of the sample, such as
market value, investment, cash flow, stock performance, etc., are reported in the Appendix.
There I also report correlations between variables and break the sample down by industry
groups. The firm variables constructed from Compustat should be self-explanatory, and are
explained in detail in the notes in the Appendix.
Total options outstanding represent on average 5.7% of shares outstanding of the firm at
the end of 1994, and the average ratio of CEO options to total outstanding options is about 1/8.20
Of course if every company granted options to the chief executive officer in the same proportion,
there would be no hope of identification. The correlation between CEO options and total options
is .55. I rank CEO options and total options across firms, and then test whether the median of the
differences in rank between the two is zero. The test-statistic, under the hypothesis of equal
ranking of CEO and total options, has a p-value of .0043.
Figures 3 and 4 are histograms displaying the variation in the size of option programs and
the fraction of outstanding options held by the CEO, respectively. Forty-five percent of firms in
the sample have outstanding stock options representing over 5% of outstanding shares at the end
20 CEO options is the sum of incentive stock options and non-qualified options. In the sample, each type of option
has the same typical terms: exercise price is fair market price at the date of grant, expiration date is five to ten years
from the date of grant, and options become exercisable gradually over a period of years (e. g., 20% over five years).
The main difference between the two options is the tax treatment upon exercise. The optionee pays no tax on an
incentive stock option (ISO) until the stock is sold, and then the gains over the exercise price are taxed at the capital
gains rate, provided the option plan meets certain conditions set by the IRS (section 422). When a non-qualified
option is realized, the optionee pays tax on the gain over the exercise price, and the corporation receives a deduction
from taxable income for the same amount.
of 1994, and 14% have outstanding options representing over 10% of shares outstanding. 2'
CEOs held over one quarter of a firm's stock options in I 1% of the sample. 22 Forty-six firms
had stock option programs in which the CEO had no holdings. Thirty-two firms have no
outstanding options, including Berkshire Hathaway. Its CEO, Warren Buffett, is one of the lone
voices in corporate American sounding alarms about option-based compensation.
The proxy statements also report compensation and stock option holdings for executives
other than the CEO. The number of executive officers serving at the end of fiscal 1994 and
covered by the proxy statement reporting requirements is typically five. In the few cases when
more or less than five are reported, total option holdings for the group are scaled to reflect five
officers. Figure 5 displays the histogram of the fraction of a corporation's outstanding options
held by the top five executives. The median ratio of the top 5 officers' holdings to total options
is .278, with substantial variation across firms. Specifications throughout the paper will focus on
the option holdings of the CEO, as some of the reported executives may have more limited ties to
the actual operations of the firm.23
Figure 6 displays the distribution of direct individual ownership across the 827
corporations in the sample. Standard and Poor's Security Owner's Stock Guides provide
institutional ownership data which covers investment companies (mutual funds), banks,
21 Borland International (software), Information Resources (data base products), Octel Communications (voice
processing systems), Cadence Design Systems (software), and Structural Dynamics Resources (computer
engineering) all have options outstanding exceeding 25% of shares currently outstanding. The ratio of outstanding
options to shares currently outstanding is .074 for Disney, .041 for GE, .139 for General Mills, .034 for General
Motors, .115 for Heinz, .058 for IBM, .156 for Merrill Lynch, , and .196 for Microsoft.
22 The CEOs of Gateway 2000 (computers), NACCO Industries (fork lifts / coal mining), McDonnell Douglas
(aircraft), Mercury Finance (consumer finance), Diagnostic Products (medical products), and Western National (life
insurance) hold over 60% of their corporation's outstanding options.
23 The qualitative results obtained throughout also hold when the CEO options are replaced by those held by the top
5 executives.
insurance companies, college endowments, and "13F" money managers. Thus, direct individual
ownership excludes household holdings of corporate equity though mutual funds or pension
plans. Direct individual ownership is a proxy for the tax status of a corporation's shareholders.
As mentioned earlier, the tax differential between dividends and capital gains is largest for the
individual investor. Therefore, my measure of individual ownership should be highly correlated
with the fraction of shareholders of a firm which are most concerned about the tax consequences
of distributions, reap the biggest tax advantage from capital gains as opposed to dividends, and
have direct control over their shares.
There is variation in the fraction of shares held directly by individuals, as direct
individual ownership is less than 20% of the firm for one sixth of the sample and there is direct
individual ownership of at least 60% of shares in one eighth of the sample. The above reasoning
suggests that one would expect a correlation between payout policy and the individual ownership
share if taxes were driving trends in corporate distributions.
Most of the firms make distributions of some sort, as three quarters pay dividends and
half repurchased stock in 1995 (31% repurchase more than 1% of market value). There is
substantial variation in firms across market value and industrial classification. Half the sample
was a member of the S & P 500 and 37% was a member of the MidCap 400 at the end of 1994.
The rest were listed in Forbes but in neither of the Standard and Poor's indices.
IV. Empirical Results
I now employ a variety of estimation techniques to disentangle the lini Detween option
programs, the form of CEO compensation, and firm payout policy. Tables 9-13 present "reduced
form" regressions of a firm's cash distributions and retention of earnings of the form:
(Payout Policy) = 0o + PI * TOTAL OPTIONS + 02 * CEO OPTIONS +
f3~ * INDIV. OWNERSHIP + P4 * FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS + E
Payout Policy may be defined as the level of stock buybacks, the propensity to repurchase stock,
earnings retention, and/or the probability of falling into one of four payout policies.
For this study, the primary focus will be on the magnitude and importance of P3 and P2,
the coefficients on the option variables. Clearly, the decision to repurchase is also impacted by
the composition of shareholders and the financial situation and investment opportunities of the
firm. For example, one might expect that a correlation between option programs and share
repurchases reflects an omitted underlying shareholder preference for share repurchases, perhaps
motivated by taxes. From a tax perspective, individuals should have the biggest preference for
share buybacks. If firms were learning how to minimize the tax burden of their shareholders,
one would expect a positive correlation in the cross-section between share repurchases and direct
individual ownership of the corporation. Thus, the proportion of direct individual ownership in
the corporation is also included in specifications.
Clearly, the ability of a firm to finance share buybacks should be influenced by the firm's
cash flow. The "traditional" view of dividend taxation (Poterba & Summers (1985)) suggests
equity buybacks/issues are the marginal source of investment funds. Thus, share repurchases
may be adjusted to accommodate past investment needs of the firm. The decision to repurchase
shares should also depend on the marginal investment opportunities of the firm (proxied for by
Tobin's q). Ceteris paribus, firms with good investment opportunities may opt to use cash to
finance investment as opposed to distributing it to shareholders through share buybacks (Jensen
(1986)). On the other hand, a standard signaling model may predict a positive relationship
between distributions and q, as payouts signal firm quality. Previous work suggests such factors
as cash on hand (repurchase is then easier to conduct, or firm is more attractive takeover target),
the leverage of the firm (repurchase can redo capital structure of firm by adjusting debt-equity
ratio, or using cash for repurchase is more risky more highly leveraged firm is), and firm size (a
proxy for financing costs, asymmetric information, etc.) may also impact the decision to buy
back stock. Finally, specifications are reported both with and without industry controls.24
4.1 Basic Results
Table 9 presents estimates from a Tobit model for the level of share repurchases in 1995.
Total outstanding options are significantly and substantively related to share buybacks. Once the
size of the option program is included in the specification, CEO option holdings are if anything
negatively correlated with share repurchases (although insignificantly so when other firm
characteristics are included in the specification).25 Lagged investment and cash flow have the
expected sign and are strongly correlated with stock buybacks. Consistent with earlier work,
such as Bagwell and Shoven (1988), highly leveraged firms are less likely to repurchase stock
(this could reflect financial distress or adjustment of debt-equity ratio through repurchase). Both
direct individual ownership and Tobin's q have no predictive power for the magnitude of stock
buybacks. Given the tax preference for individual shareholders for distributions made via stock
buybacks, it is surprising that there is no cross-sectional correlation between them.
24 I will assign corporations to industry groups as follows. Firms are first grouped to SIC one digit categories.
Then, any 2-digit SIC group with more than five firms is controlled for separately.
25 When one does not control for outstanding options to all employees, there is a positive but insignificant
correlation between CEO option holdings and stock buybacks. A similar pattern emerges when one focuses on the
option holdings of the top 5 executives.
The marginal effect of stock options evaluated at the sample average indicates that a 10%
point increase in outstanding options normalized by shares outstanding is associated with
roughly a .9% point increase in the repurchases normalized by assets that year (the average
payout rate for the whole sample is 1.6%). This estimated increase in repurchase activity (.09
marginal effect) matches fairly well the average level of outstanding options which are exercised
during the year which is .08 in the sample.26
Table 10 presents estimates for regressions of the stock buyback decision in 1995, share
repurchases in 1995-96, and share dilution in 1995. Specifications (1)- (2) present the marginal
effect of options upon the decision to repurchase at least one percent of market value in 1995
using a Probit model evaluated at the "average characteristics of the sample." The same pattern
in coefficients observed in the levels specification is generally observed in the binary choice
model. Total outstanding options is positively correlated with the decision to repurchase shares.
A firm with options representing 10% of shares outstanding is 10 percentage points more likely
to buy back more than 1% of its stock than a firm with no option program (average for all firms
is .31). This relationship is not driven by the option holdings of the CEO or executive officers.
While price appreciation over the previous year and Tobin's q do not have much of an
impact on the level of stock buybacks, they do seem to impact the decision of whether to
repurchase shares. Firms with higher investment opportunities, as proxied for by q, are
significantly less likely to decide to repurchase stock. This is consistent with Jensen's (1986)
free cash flow theory, but inconsistent with most signaling models in which distributions are
26 This ratio is obtained by multiplying the fraction of outstanding options at the end of 1994 which are exercisable
by the fraction of exercisable options which are exercised in 1994. As option programs age, and previous grants
vest, the fraction of outstanding options exercised each year should rise.
increasing with q. Nohel and Tarhan (1998) also find that positive investor reaction to share
buybacks is best explained by the free cash flow hypothesis as opposed to signaling.
Specifications (3)- (4) represent the decision to repurchase stock in both 1995 and 1996.
The marginal effect of outstanding options upon share repurchases over 1995-96 is .17, or twice
the impact estimated in Table 9 for stock buybacks in one year. This is plausible, as option
exercises in 1995-96 would likely be double that observed in 1995 alone.
Specifications (5) - (6) examine dilution of shares outstanding over 1995 by estimating
median regressions. The results imply that the median dilution of shares outstanding over 1995
is about 1.3% for a firm with outstanding options representing 10% of outstanding shares (one
cannot reject that the median dilution equals the average fraction of outstanding options which
are exercised in a given year). One also cannot reject a zero correlation between the change in
shares outstanding and the size of the option program at the 25'h percentile. This implies a
sizeable number of firms partially fund the option program with repurchased shares. The main
conclusion to draw, counter to previous work, is that once one controls for total options, the
"optionization" of CEO compensation has no explanatory power for repurchases.
So far the evidence has been supportive of the "funding hypothesis". However, I would
not say that it refutes the basic reasoning that the form of CEO compensation can alter
distribution policy.
It is important to remember the extraordinary growth in firm value since the early 1980s,
and in particular 1995 and 1996 when the payout decisions of the firms in my sample were
observed. The average two year return over 1995-96 for firms in my sample is 50%. Also,
many firms likely had good internal investment opportunities. Thus, a CEO concerned about the
value of his outstanding options would likely rather retain earnings as opposed to buying back
company stock which is selling at historic multiples or increasing dividends. Under this line of
reasoning, one would expect retentions to be increasing with CEO options.
To investigate this hypothesis I estimate regressions of the rate of retention of earnings
over 1995-96. Retentions are earnings less cash used to finance common dividends and share
repurchases, and the median retention rate for the sample is .54. Firms in which CEO's have
large holdings of stock options retain significantly and substantially more of their earnings over
1995-96. I estimate both robust and median regressions because cash distributions greatly
exceed earnings for some corporations over this period. The estimates, presented in Table 1 I1,
suggest a firm whose CEO holds options representing 1% of outstanding shares will retain 3-4
percentage points more of earnings, and the results are generally significant at the .10 level
across specifications and estimators. This finding is consistent with the agency hypothesis.
One could argue that the firms issuing options to workers and CEOs are not a random
subsample of firms. For example, firms with strong growth opportunities will be more apt to
retain earnings. They may also be more apt to offer stock-based compensation (both to free up
current cash flow and because investment opportunities may lead to high stock returns). Thus,
the positive correlation between CEO option holdings and earnings retention may reflect strong
investment opportunities rather than the CEO adjusting distribution policy to maximize the value
of his/her stock options. However, while price appreciation and Tobin's q are associated with a
greater rate of retention of earnings, their inclusion in the specification does not eliminate the
impact of CEO option holdings.
4.2 Multinomial Logit Model of Payout/Retention Decisions
To further shed light on the payout and retention decisions of firms, I estimate a
multinomial logit model. I classify firms into one of four categories based on whether the firm
repurchased more than I% of its market value in 1995 and/or increased the dividend payout rate
in 1995 over the average payout rate from 1992-94. Just under half of the firms neither
repurchased shares or increased dividends, 22% increased dividends and didn't repurchase stock
(meaning didn't repurchase at least I % of market value), 18% repurchased over 1% of market
value and did not increase dividends, and the remaining 13% both repurchased shares and
increased dividends.
The results of the estimation of the propensity of falling into the four payout regimes is
presented for a parsimonious specification in Table 12. Besides total and CEO options, lagged
investment, lagged cash flow, and Tobin's q are included in the specification. Since the
coefficients are difficult to interpret, the partial derivatives of the probability of choosing a
particular payout are evaluated at the sample means and reported in Table 12 as well.
The results are broadly consistent with those obtained earlier. The marginal effects imply
that a firm with a stock option program representing 10% of outstanding shares is about 18
percentage points more likely to repurchase stock and not increase dividends and 20 percentage
points more likely to neither repurchase shares or raise dividends relative to a firm with no stock
option program. Retained earnings can perhaps be used to repurchase stock at a later date,
whereas dividend increases lower the cash available for other activities such as stock buybacks.
It comes as no shock that the firm with outstanding options is estimated to be 26% less likely to
not buyback stock and increase dividends. 27
27 If a dividend increase is instead defined as a increase in dividends per share (as opposed to dividends normalized
by market value) the estimated marginal probabilities and associated standard errors are as follows for the total
outstanding options variable:
RP = 1 & DIV T = 0: 1.362 (.368), RP = I & DIV 1 = 1:-.324 (.576), RP = 0 & DIV T = 1: -3.695 (.709), RP = 0
& DIV T = 0: 2.658 (.657)
The effect of CEO options on corporate policy is less pronounced given the imprecise
estimates. A one percentage point increase in CEO options, holding total options constant, is
associated with a 3. 1 % point fall in the probability the firm repurchases shares and does not
increase dividends (t-statistic = 1.88), with most of the probability shifting to the retention of
earnings regime.
The marginal effects of investment and q are also worthy of attention. Consistent with
earlier results, lagged investment is negatively correlated with subsequent decisions to
repurchase stock. This raises the possibility that share repurchases may at least partially be a
marginal source of investments. Given the favorable tax treatment of repurchases over dividends
for individual investors, the more share repurchases are adjusted in response to investment needs,
the higher is the after-tax return investors will receive in lieu of further investment in the firm,
and thus the higher is the firm's user cost of capital. Further work is needed to better determine
the relationship between investment needs and movement by the firm along the equity
issuance/repurchase margin. At a minimum, the growth in share repurchases and the evident link
between share buybacks and lagged investment justifies a re-examination of "trapped equity"
models of investment.
Tobin's q lowers the probability of a share repurchase and no dividend increase, and
increases the probability a firm does not repurchase more than 1% of market value but does
increase dividends. This is consistent with the free cash flow model applying to share
repurchases and signaling models applying to dividend increases (Bernheim (1991) and others
discuss how dividends are an effective signal of firm quality because of the high tax cost
associated with their use).
An underlying assumption of the multinomial logit model is that the choice between
alternative A and B is independent of the availability of alternative C, after controlling for the
explanatory variables. Hausman & McFadden (1984) suggest a specification test which is
conducted by dropping one or more choices from the model and testing for a change in the
coefficients for the remaining alternative(s). I conduct the test by dropping the firms that
repurchased shares and increased dividends and dropping the firms that only increased
dividends. One cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct specification. Further, no coefficient
estimate changes in value by more than its standard error when the two alternatives are deleted,
and the options variables in particular are unchanged.
4.3 Other Robustness Checks
I find that while total options are strongly correlated with share repurchases, options held
by the CEO if anything decreases buyback propensity. Previous work concluded that CEO
option holdings were driving share repurchases. It is natural to wonder what is driving the
discrepancy in results.
First, it is worth pointing out that my sample is considerably larger and more recent, and
my data is of better quality. I focus on actual rather than announced share repurchases. I am
also able to distinguish between whether the relationship between stock options and share
repurchases is driven by CEOs maximizing the value of their own stock-based compensation, or
instead reflects a more prevalent desire to fund option programs with repurchased shares
regardless of the composition of the CEO's compensation. For example, a weak positive
relationship between share repurchases and the option holdings of the CEO or top 5 executives
of the firm evaporates when outstanding options for all employees are included in the
regressions.
Table 13 provides some robustness tests by adding alternative covariates to the basic
Tobit specification of Table 9. For example, the general relationship between option programs
and stock buybacks is unaffected by the ratio of CEO options to total options or the option
holdings of the top 5 executives.
As an alternative measure of how "important" option-based compensation is to the CEO,
I divide the market value of the stock underlying the CEO's options by the CEO's annual cash
salary and bonus. CEOs for whom this ratio is large may be more concerned with the value of
their options, and hence how payout policy impacts their value, relative to firms for whom this is
small. The median value of this ratio in the sample is 7.5 and the mean is 11.8. A ratio of eight
would indicate that a dividend payout of 5% would reduce the value of the stock underlying
his/her options by 40% of annual salary. This ratio is negatively correlated with stock buybacks
(t - statistic = 1.37) and its inclusion does not alter the impact of total outstanding options.
Finally, one could argue that agency problems and decisions about the composition of
distributions extend below the CEO. Perhaps total outstanding options is a better proxy for
"decision makers" option holdings than those of the CEO or top 5 executives. Or perhaps those
with influence over the distribution decision take into account how payout policy will impact the
value of their employees' options in general, regardless of whether they personally have any
wealth in options. An indirect method of testing this is to include the ratio of exercisable options
to options outstanding in the regression. The "funding hypothesis" suggests that firms whose
options may be exercised now will be more likely to buy back stock than firms whose options
are not yet exercisable. 28 The "agency hypothesis" does not predict any relationship between the
28 One would expect a positive, but weak relationship given that many options become exercisable within a couple
years from the date of grant, but need not be exercised for up to ten years. Also, unexercisable options at the
beginning of the year may become exercisable by year-end.
fraction of options which are exercisable and share repurchases, as payout policy impacts the
value of exercisable and unexercisable options in the same manner. The last column of Table 13
reveals that the amnount of exercisable options is a positive and significant predictor of share
buybacks.
4.4 Interpretation of Causality
First, a cross-sectional analysis cannot rule out that some firm-specific effect is driving
the correlation between options and payout policy. One possibility, raised by Jolls and others, is
that a correlation between share repurchases and option programs could reflect an underlying
shareholder preference for share repurchases. Under this scenario, the option program is thus
approved by shareholders to provide top executives with the incentive to carry out share
buybacks as opposed to dividend increases, and thus the causality underlying the correlation is
reversed.
Such reasoning also implies that firms whose shareholders prefer dividends to share
repurchases should set up compensation to induce those distributions. For example, dividend-
protected options, dividends declared on stock while the option is outstanding accrue in an
account, should be granted to CEOs of firms whose shareholders prefer dividends. In my sample
of 827 firms, only two firms mention in proxies that their options are dividend-protected,
Lyondell Petrochemical and Atlantic Richfield. Given that some firm's shareholders may prefer
dividends, but only two of 827 firms have dividend-protected options, the reverse causality
argument that variation in shareholder preferences across firms is driving the correlation between
repurchases and options results is somewhat weakened.
A shareholder preference for share repurchases would likely arise because of its tax
treatment relative to dividend income for individual investors. However, there is essentially no
cross-sectional correlation between the proportion of direct individual ownership in corporations
and the propensity of that firm to buy back stock. Further, the estimated link between option
programs and share repurchases is generally unaffected when firm covariates are added. 29 This
suggests that if there is some omitted factor like management skill or corporate governance
driving the relationship, it must be uncorrelated with all the observable firm characteristics
included in the specifications.
If the compensation board wants to distribute a certain amount of wealth to its employees
via stock options, it may adjust option grants to reflect the past distribution policy of the firm.
Thus, the interpretation of the options coefficient could be clouded by reverse causality.
However, I would argue if present at all, this endogeneity would bias downward the options
coefficient in a share repurchase reduced form. For example, suppose there are two firms which
are identical, except one pays dividends and the other repurchases shares. If each firm wants to
distribute the same amount of wealth to employees via stock options, the dividend-paying firm
will have to grant more options to compensate for the reduction in the option value when a
dividend is paid.
A second issue is the interpretation of the relationship between firm payouts and the other
financial variables such as investment and cash flow, which clearly belong in regressions of
distributions. Obviously, firms make decisions over many financial variables simultaneously.
Assuming firms have access to external financing, and since most models focus on investment
opportunities and decisions as the primary determinant of firm value, it is natural to think of
distributions responding on the margin to investment needs rather than the reverse. Given
29 When only total outstanding options and CEO options are included in the Tobit specification of share
repurchases, the coefficient on total options / shares outstanding is .214 (.064). When firm financial characteristics
and industry controls are included the coefficient is .195 (.068).
perfect measurement of investment opportunities (Tobin's q), the coefficient on lagged cash flow
can also be given a causal interpretation. However, since the form of distributions can
potentially impact future investment through changing the user cost of capital, feedback effects
are possible. Further, mismeasurement of q could potentially cloud interpretation of the
coefficient on cash flow.
My response to this is two-fold. First, this paper analyzes the link between option
programs, CEO compensation, and payout policy of firms in the mid 1990s. While the impact of
other variables upon distributions is also of interest, that is not the focus of this paper.
Establishing that the estimated impact of options upon payouts is not too sensitive to the
inclusion of other relevant firm-specific variables, which may be partly endogenous, is
confirming evidence for the options effect. Second, it is nearly impossible to find truly
exogenous shocks to investment, which wouldn't also be correlated with shocks in cash
distributions.30 This does not mean we should give up, but it does mean we should be explicit
about what we are estimating and how we interpret the estimates.
V. Stock Option Exercises
So far I have focussed attention on the impact of option programs upon future distribution
decisions. Tables 14 and 15 instead present evidence on the dilution stock option exercises
create during the year of exercise and document how well trends in stock option exercises match
trends in stock buybacks over the past five years.
30 If the data set was firms in 1987 rather than 1995, one could use variation across firms in the composition of
capital as an instrument for investment. Elimination of the equipment tax credit raises the cost of capital
disproportionately for equipment-intensive firms.
Table 14 presents estimates of the dilution of shares outstanding in 1994 upon option
exercises in 1994 both with and without other firm covariates. The coefficient of one from the
median regression suggests up to half of the firms at least partially fund option exercises by
repurchasing shares during the year of exercise.
I also obtain data from 1993-97 for all the non-bank and utility firms who are currently a
member of the S & P 100 and/or the Dow Jones Industrial Index. I also exclude CBS and
Columbia/HCA Healthcare who do not have option data over the five year period from the
sample. This leaves a panel of 98 firms. Table 15 demonstrates both the yearly dilution
resulting from option exercises and the growth of stock option exercises in the mid 1990s.
Except for 1993, the median dilution resulting from stock option exercises is around .35-.5 and
significantly less than one. Perhaps most striking is how the growth in stock option exercises
matches fairly closely the growth in share repurchases in the mid 1990s. For example, at the
same time the share repurchase payout rate increased from .009 to .025 from 1993-97, the market
value of the stock options exercised (normalized by firm value) increased from .007 to .015 for
these 98 firms. Given the growth of stock-based compensation since the early 1990s, one would
expect option exercises to increase in the future. If the past five years is any indication, this
should have ramifications for future corporate distributions.
VI. Conclusion
There are many possible motivations for firms to use cash to repurchase their own stock.
This paper has focused on the role of stock option programs in explaining the surge in corporate
buybacks in the mid 1 990s. Determining what is underlying this change in corporate payout
policy is essential if one is to assess whether the trend will continue, to what extent the form of
CEO compensation impacts firm payout policy, and ultimately what the repercussions are for
firm value.
Previous work has focused on incentives provided by CEO compensation to avoid
dividend payments, which reduce the value of outstanding options. Substituting share
repurchases for dividends will indeed increase the value of outstanding options, but so will an
increased retention of earnings. Firms may also have an incentive to fund option plans with
repurchased equity as opposed to issuing new shares, so as to not immediately dilute such
measures as earnings per share.
Collecting CEO compensation and option program data at the end of fiscal year 1994 for
a sample of over 800 corporations enables me to identify what is driving the link between stock
options and share buybacks. I find that total options outstanding is a strong predictor of share
buybacks, regardless of the composition of CEO compensation. CEO option holdings is a strong
predictor of the earnings retention of firms over 1995-96. There is no cross-sectional
relationship between share repurchases and the level of direct individual ownership in the firm,
as tax motivations would suggest.
The immediate dilution of outstanding shares, which would occur if new shares were
issued to finance option programs, would makes the cost of stock options apparent. An option
program accompanied by share repurchases, on the other hand, lowers cash reserves of the firm,
but won't impact current earnings from operations or dilute shareholder's ownership share of the
firm. A clever analyst can likely ascertain the liability outstanding stock options represent.
Nonetheless an option program combined with a repurchase program makes it more difficult to
observe this liability, and some naive investors may not appropriately account for it.
Given the growth in stock-based compensation in corporate America, one is left to
ponder: To what extent has the market already capitalized into share value the ultimate cost that
options exercised in the next ten years will represent? If the market hasn't yet, will it in the
future? One of the golden rules of economics is that there is no free lunch, although Warren
Buffet, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, seems to believe many of his colleagues have found one in
the form of option-based compensation.
[Some contend] that options should not be viewed as a cost because they "aren't dollars out of a company's coffers."
I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their
reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you're
a CEO and subscribe to this "no cash-no cost" theory of accounting, I'll make you an offer you can't refuse: Give
us a call at Berkshire Hathaway and we will be happy to sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long-term
options of your company's stock. (Warren Buffett, Letter to Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 1992 Annual
Report, taken from Revsine, Collins, & Johnson (1999).)
It should come as no surprise that Berkshire Hathaway has a policy of converting all option
programs of companies it acquires to cash based compensation. "The acquiree's true cost is
thereby bought out of the closet and charged, as it should be, against earnings (Warren Buffett,
Forbes, May 18, 1998)."
What does this suggest for future trends in corporate policy? Clearly there is a reluctance
for corporations, especially large firms, to increase outstanding shares in response to option
programs. Given the increase in the "optionization" of compensation, and the absence of a
substantial pre-funding of options (there is a small number of repurchased shares held in
Treasury among those firms with option programs), I would expect share repurchases to continue
to grow. The difference between the top individual tax rate on labor income and the long-term
capital gains rate was increased by the Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997, further suggesting
corporations will have an incentive to substitute capital gains income for labor income to reduce
their employees' tax liability.
This paper suggests four avenues for further research. First, to what extent is stock-based
compensation capitalized into share prices? While the cost of cash-based compensation is
incurred by the firm immediately, the ultimate cost of stock-based compensation is uncertain
when granted and is realized in the future. Feldstein & Seligman (1981) and Bulow, et al. (1987)
find that a corporation's unfunded pension liability is capitalized into share prices. Other
examples of research in this vein include studies of whether property taxes are capitalized into
housing values and whether municipal bond prices reflect budgetary institutions. While
collecting the data on the distribution of exercise prices for outstanding options for a large cross-
section of firms may be daunting, future research into whether option programs are accounted for
in stock prices would be fruitful.
Second, how should the market view repurchase announcements by firms with large
numbers of outstanding options? The positive excess return surrounding announcements has
been well documented, but given that the repurchased shares will likely be shortly re-issued,
there is little permanent purging of free cash flow from the firm. On the other hand, the option
programs funded with repurchased shares transfer stock from outsiders (tendering shareholders)
to insiders (employees). This increased insider ownership may reduce agency problems by
aligning the incentives of employees and shareholders and thus increase firm value.
Third, more work needs to be done investigating the link between investment needs and
distributions. Share repurchases have grown dramatically in the mid 1990s and their inherit
flexibility allows then to serve multiple purposes (Jagannathan, et al. (1998) discuss the
flexibility of share repurchases). Relative to dividends, they may be a more suitable marginal
source of investment funds. To the extent that investment needs are being financed at least
partially by movements along the equity repurchase/issuance margin, that should cause us to
rethink the correct view of the cost of capital and the benefits of corporate and personal tax
integration.
Finally, this paper set out to explore recent trends in corporate cash distributions. In
doing so, it also revealed the growth of stock-based compensation. A survey by Share Data
indicates 45% of companies with option plans and 5000 or more employees now grant options to
all of their workers. Three years ago only one in ten firms did. Further, 74% of companies with
option plans and less than $50 million in sales offered stock option plans to all of their workers.
Stock-based compensation is no longer for top executives only. This raises questions as to how
general workers value stock option grants as opposed to cash compensation, especially risk-
averse individuals. The analysis in Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath, Huddtrt, & Lang
(1998) suggests employees may be sacrificing substantial value by exercising options
substantially before the expiration date. Also, not accounting for growing stock-based
compensation in standard measures of labor income likely leads to an understatement of real
wage growth in the U. S. the past few years.
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Table 1: Aggregate Payout Policy for S & P 500 Firms 1977-1996
(in billions of 1996 $)
$ Share
Repurchases
less $ Sale of
Stock for Share
$ Share Repurchasing $ Sale of Repurchase Dividend
Repurchase Firms Stock $ Dividend Payout Rate Payout Rate
1977 6.6 2.8 19.3 74.5 .004 .044
1978 6.5 1.3 16.6 76.8 .005 .054
1979 7.0 -.6 20.2 78.3 .005 .058
1980 8.3 .1 26.0 77.9 .006 .058
1981 7.4 1.0 35.9 78.7 .005 .049
1982 12.5 3.5 32.2 78.0 .009 .056
1983 10.4 -.6 39.6 80.5 .007 .052
1984 38.0 28.5 23.6 81.3 .021 .042
1985 53.0 37.7 32.8 81.2 .031 .047
1986 47.4 27.6 37.5 88.6 .023 .043
1987 57.5 39.8 29.3 90.5 .025 .039
1988 58.8 47.9 17.3 106.2 .026 .046
1989 51.5 28.0 29.4 93.5 .022 .041
1990 44.3 34.2 18.2 92.7 .016 .034
1991 22.7 9.3 33.4 90.4 .009 .036
1992 28.6 17.7 35.7 91.6 .009 .030
1993 34.9 18.4 37.0 92.2 .011 .030
1994 40.0 26.6 26.7 92.2 .012 .028
1995 63.3 48.8 22.3 104.7 .019 .032
1996 75.4 51.4 36.4 98.9 .018 .023
Source: Compustat files.
Share repurchases, sale of stock, and dividends are totals for common stock. The denominator
for the payout rate is the aggregate market value at the end of the previous year. The CPI-U
index taken from the 1998 Economic Report of the President is used to convert all dollar totals
into 1996 dollars.
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Table 3: Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rates &
individual Ownership of Corporate Equity in U. S. 1977-1996
Average Marginal Tax Rate on:
Difference
between Div. and Direct Individual
Accruing Accruing Ownership of
Dividends Capital Gains Capital Gains Corporate Equity
1977 .259 .057 .202 .545
1978 .250 .055 .195 .525
1979 .262 .042 .220 .542
1980 .269 .042 .227 .562
1981 .266 .042 .224 .545
1982 .208 .035 .173 .518
1983 .202 .034 .168 .494
1984 .183 .032 .151 .474
1985 .177 .032 .145 .473
1986 .181 .032 .149 .467
1987 .170 .045 .125 .460
1988 .147 .046 .101 .452
1989 .149 .047 .102 .439
1990 .143 .046 .097 .441
1991 .149 .046 .103 .470
1992 .152 .047 .105 .479
1993 .162 .047 .115 .464
1994 .159 .047 .112 .439
1995 .160 .048 .112 .449
1996 .159 .048 .111 .422
Source: Poterba (1998) for weighted tax rates and Poterba & Samwick (1995) and Flow of
Funds for ownership. "Direct" individual ownership of corporate equity is direct household
ownership as reported in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds, adjusted to subtract out holdings
of nonprofit institutions. It does not included tax-deferred holdings through annuities or pension
plans and does not include mutual fund holdings.
"Options" refers to shares
beginning of the year. This
reserved
measures
for options (annual data item 215 in Compustat) at the
options currently outstanding and those available for future
grants. "Shares held in Treasury" refers to shares of common stock held in the firm's Treasury
(annual data item 87) normalized by shares outstanding. Shares held in Treasury are not counted
as outstanding and reflect repurchased shares that have not been re-issued as of yet. Weighted
statistics are weighted by firm market capitalization.
"Shares reserved for options" overstates outstanding options, which Compustat does not report,
since it also includes the number of shares available for future grants under existing plans. The
correlation of shares reserved for options with outstanding options was .88 and the median ratio
of total outstanding options to total shares reserved for options was .7 in a sample of 827 firms at
the end of 1994 I constructed.
Table 4: Optionization and its "Funding" for NYSE and S & P 500 Firms 1985-1996
Shares held in Treasury /
Options / Shares Outstanding Options
Unweighted Weighted by market value Unweighted Weighted
Median 90th% Median 90th% Median Median
1985 .0451 .1149 .0303 .0812 .0273 .1045
1986 .0467 .1203 .0302 .0866 .0184 .1216
1987 .0459 .1221 .0377 .0892 .0077 .1166
1988 .0479 .1310 .0360 .0845 .0614 .1848
1989 .0506 .1430 .0353 .0852 .0486 .2235
1990 .0538 .1479 .0346 .0941 .0470 .3236
1991 .0575 .1624 .0370 .0885 .0315 .3368
1992 .0575 .1639 .0406 .1015 .0160 .2392
1993 .0562 .1602 .0422 .1034 .0046 .2148
1994 .0597 .1551 .0449 .1179 0 .0507
1995 .0650 .1639 .0469 .1154 0 .0170
1996 .0720 .1608 .0535 .1239 .0022 .1223
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Table 6: Option Exercises, Share Repurchases, & Dilution fiscal years 1993-97
(S & P 100 and Dow Jones firms with option exercises over 93-97
exceeding 10% of shares outstanding)
(Option Exercises
1993-97) / Share Repurchases
(Shares Outstanding % A Shares 1993-97 Repurchases 93-97 /
at end of 1992) Outstanding 1993-97 (million $) Net Income 93-97
Aluminum Co. .15 -.02 1396 .55
of America
Cisco Systems .15 .39 508 .18
Computer .11 .57 0 0
Sciences Corp.
Merrill Lynch .10 -.19 3788 .55
Microsoft .20 .11 5609 .61
Monsanto .11 -.01 1111 .44
National .15 .49 123 .20
Semiconductor
Tektronix .13 .10 76 .17
Travelers .25 .72 3311 .37
Source: Annual Reports to Shareholders 1993-1997.
All numbers adjusted for stock splits.
Table 7: Share Repurchases, Option Exercises, and Earnings for Microsoft
(fiscal years 1993 - 1997)
Shares
Share Repurchases Exercised Options Net Income Outstanding
at end of year
# of shares # of shares # of shares
Million $ (millions) Million $ (millions) Million $ (millions)
FY 1993 250 12 208 52 953 1128
FY 1994 348 18 239 42 1146 1162
FY 1995 649 24 278 35 1453 1176
FY 1996 1261 26 421 40 2195 1194
FY 1997 3101 37 597 45 3439 1204
Total 5609 117 1743 214 9186 -
Source: Microsoft Annual Reports to Shareholders 1993-1997.
All share numbers adjusted for stock splits.
Number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year 1992 was 1088 million.
Table 8: Summary Statistics for Option Programs, CEO Compensation, & Distributions
for 827 Firms drawn from Forbes, S & P 500, and MidCap 400 at end of 1994
Mean & std. deviation Median 10th- 90th%
Total Options .057 .046 .013 - .115
Outstanding (.047)
normalized by shares
outstanding
at end of 1994
CEO Options .007 .004 .000 - .016
Outstanding (.011)
normalized by shares
outstanding
at end of 1994
CEO Options / .124 .090 .018 - .256
Total Options (. 116)
Exercisable Options / .520 .506 .239 - .811
Total Options (.219)
CEO Salary + Bonus 1209 956 445 - 1999
in thousands of $ (1342)
Direct Individual .38 .36 .16 - .64
Ownership end of 94 (.19)
Prob(Repurchase > 0) .49
(.50)
Prob(Repurchase > .31
.01 *Market Value) (.46)
REPURCHASES .016 0 0- .052
in 1995 / (.041)
ASSETS end of 1994
REPUCHASES in .041 .006 0-.115
1995 & 1996 / (.086)
ASSETS end of 1994
Prob(DIVIDEND > 0) .75
(.43)
DIVIDENDS in 95 / .018 .012 0 - .043
ASSETS end of 1994 (.024)
REPURCHASES / .31 .15 0 - .90
(Total Cash Payouts) (.35)
in 1995
See Appendix for other characteristics of sample and distribution across industries.
___
Table 9: Regressions of Share Repurchases in 1995
Dep. Variable = REPURCHASES in 95 / ASSETS at end of 1994
Coefficients from Tobit specification are reported
Total Outstanding .177 .224 .195
Options / (.055) (.065) (.068)
Shares Outstanding
CEO Outstanding .118 -.404 -. 168
Options / Shares (.251) (.295) (.306)
Outstanding
Individual .004 -.003 .003 .000
Ownership (.014) (.014) (.014) (.015)
of Firm
Lagged Investment -.299 -.284 -. 303 -.224
(.051) (.050) (.051) (.058)
Lagged .297 .286 .297 .261
Cash Flow (.052) (.052) (.052) (.054)
Tobin's q -.001 .000 -.001 -.003
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Cash on hand -.024 -.006 -.028 -.008
at end of 94 (.023) (.023) (.024) (.024)
Long-term Debt at -.057 -.056 -.056 -.059
end of 94 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.020)
Price Appreciation -.0 10 -.008 -. 010 -.008
in 1994 (.010) (.010) (.009) (.010)
Log(Value in .007 .006 .006 .006
millions of $) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Constant -.072 -.057 -.066
(.018) (.019) (.019)
Industry Controls No No No Yes
Log Likelihood 320.4 315.5 321.3 356.8
Sample Size 781 781 781 781
Scaling Factor for .649 .568 .415
Marginal Effect
See text and Appendix for variable descriptions.
Investment, cash flow, cash on hand, and debt are normalized by total assets at end of previous
year.
Scale factor for computing marginal effects is calculated at the means of the covariates.
Forty-six of the 827 observations are lost with the inclusion of the non-option covariates.
Table 10: Regressions of Share Repurchases and Share Dilution
Marginal Effects reported from Probit in columns (1) - (2)
Coefficients from Tobit specification in columns (3) - (4)
Coefficients from Quartile Regressions reported in columns (5) - (6)
(1) (2) (3) (45) (6)
Dep. Variable:
Dep. Variable = Dep. Variable: % A in Shares
Probability (Repurchases in 95 & 96) Outstanding 1995
(RP > .01 in 1995) /ASSETS Median 25 th percentile
Total 1.065 .922 .346 .294 .126 .051
Outstanding (.434) (.484) (.112) (.115) (.022) (.045)
Options /
Shares
Outstanding
CEO -2.563 -1.172 -.228 -.147 -.110 .053
Outstanding (1.987) (2.125) (.480) (.483) (.089) (.195)
Options /
Shares
Outstanding
Individual -. 138 -. 159 .026 .026 -.006 -.003
Ownership (.094) (.105) (.023) (.024) (.003) (.005)
Of Firm
Lagged - 1.594 -1.077 -.428 -.304 .032 .050
Investment (.354) (.426) (.078) (.087) (.011) (.018)
Lagged 1.577 1.285 .397 .273 -.028 -.039
Cash Flow (.361) (.393) (.084) (.083) (.016) (.021)
Tobin's q -. 113 -.123 .004 .001 .000 .001
(.030) (.033) (.007) (.007) (.001) (.002)
Cash on hand .042 .133 -.064 -.040 .014 .014
at end of 94 (.163) (.176) (.041) (.042) (.007) (.013)
Long-term -.291 -.387 -.072 -.080 .004 .009
Debt at (.118) (.145) (.028) (.031) (.004) (.006)
end of 94
Price -. 122 -. 137 .066 .079 .011 .003
Appreciation (.066) (.073) (.015) (.015) (.003) (.006)
in 1994
Log(Value in .062 .070 .008 .008 .000 -.001
millions of $) (.015) (.017) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.001)
Constant - - -.080 - .002 -.001
(.031) (.004) (.009)
Industry No Yes No Yes No No
Controls
Log -446.0 -404.3 209.6 246.1
Likelihood
Sample Size 781 781 770 770 781 781
See notes below Table 9. "RP > .01" means share repurchases during the year exceeded 1% of
the value of the firm at the beginning of the year.
Factor to convert Tobit coefficients into marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean is .478.
Standard errors for quartile regressions are estimated by bootstrap resampling (500 iterations).
Table 11: Regression of Retention Rate of Earnings over 1995-96
Dep. Variable = 1 - (Dividends & RP in 1995-96) / (Earnings in 1995-96)
Robust Robust Median Median
Regression Regression Regression Regression
Total Outstanding -.591 -.456 -.752 -1.229
Options / (.446) (.454) (.908) (.839)
Shares Outstanding
CEO Outstanding 3.594 3.326 3.024 4.218
Options / (1.688) (1.722) (2.487) (2.295)
Shares Outstanding
Individual -.074 -.038 -.050 -.075
Ownership (.081) (.084) (.125) (.133)
of Firm
Tobin's q .031 .077 .020 .094
(.188) (.020) (.042) (.031)
Cash on hand .176 .036 .286 .119
at end of 94 (.144) (.149) (.316) (.289)
Long-term Debt at .254 .316 .319 .409
end of 94 (.100) (.112) (.165) (.143)
Price Appreciation .142 .166 .156 .143
in 1994 (.054) (.055) (.113) (.096)
Log(Va!ue in -.068 -.056 -.062 -.047
millions of $) (.013) (.013) (.017) (.019)
Constant .969 - .921
(.110) (.168)
Industry Controls No Yes No Yes
Sample Size 680 680 680 680
Standard errors for median are calculated based on bootstrapped distribution (500 iterations).
Earnings is income before extraordinary items (annual data item 20 in Compustat). Firms with
negative earnings over period are excluded.
See text and Appendix for variable descriptions.
Cash and Debt are normalized by total assets at end of 1994.
Table 12: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Payout Decisions
4 Regimes:
RP = 1 & DIV 0= 0
RP= 1 & DIV "= 1
RP= 0 & DIV 1= 1
RP=0& DIV T= 0
(RP = 1 if repurchase/market value > .01 in 1995
DIV " = 1 if dividend payout in 1995 exceeds the average over 1992-94 where
dividend payout rate = dividend / market value)
Coefficients from Multinomial Logit Model
RP= I & RP= I & RP=O& RP = 0 &
DIV r' = 0 DIV 7 = 1 DIV T = 1 DIV I = 0
Total Outstanding 7.893 -14.278 -16.045 Base case
Options / (2.426) (4.197) (3.539)
Shares Outstanding
CEO Outstanding -24.731 -7.501 .779 Base case
Options / Shares (12.433) (19.280) (14.855)
Outstanding
Lagged Investment -9.265 -9.91 1 -3.321 Base case
(2.440) (2.612) (1.581)
Lagged 10.005 15.613 10.5311 Base case
Cash Flow (2.532) (2.763) (2.245)
Tobin's q -1.083 .114 .298 Base case
(.267) (.199) (.168)
Constant -.002 -1.955 -1.493 Base case
(.346) (.315) (.261)
Estimated Marginal Effect Upon Probability of Payout Regime
RP = 1 & RP= 1 & RP = 0 & RP = O &
DIV T = 0 DIV T = 1 DIV T = I DIV ? = 0
Total Outstanding 1.805 -1.166 -2.590 1.950
Options / (.355) (.496) (.606) (.634)
Shares Outstanding
CEO Outstanding -3.143 -.330 1.111 2.363
Options / Shares (1.676) (1.867) (2.386) (2.573)
Outstanding
Lagged Investment -.938 -.738 -.019 1.694
(.388) (.350) (.288) (.392)
Lagged .709 1.123 1.022 -2.854
Cash Flow (.471) (.467) (.425) (.527)
Tobin's q -. 154 .023 .082 .049
(.037) (.019) (.026) (.039)
Constant .082 -. 157 -.202 .278
(.046) (.048) (.049) (.062)
Model Performance and a Specification Test follow on next page
__ ____ _~_~
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Table 12 (continued)
Model Performance
Log Likelihood = -858.3
Actual and Predicted Outcomes of Payout Regimes
Predicted
RP= I&
DIV 7= 0
8
0
14
23
RP= I &
DIV = I
3
4
4
3
14
RP = 0 &
DIV = I
1
34
55
28
118
RP = 0 &
DIV r = 0
124
62
109
320
615
Total
136
100
169
365
770
Specification Test by dropping "RP = 1 & DIV 7= 1" and "RP = 0 & DIV I= 1" regimes
Ho = Decision between "RP = 1 & DIV T = 0" and "RP = 0 & DIV 1T = 0" independent of alternatives
HA = Decision between "RP = 1 & DIV T = 0" and "RP = 0 & DIV T = 0" is not independent of alternatives
Test-statistic: z2 (6) = 1.69, p-value = .95
Coefficients for "RP = 1 & DIV T = 0", where "RP = 0 & DIV T = 0"
Log Likelihood = -273.9
is base case
Total Options CEO Options Investment Cash Flow Tobin's q Constant
7.782 -24.929 -8.910 9.328 -. 842 -.314
(2.403) (12.644) (2.399) (2.440) (.223) (.279)
See text and Appendix for variable descriptions.
Investment and cash flow are normalized by total assets at end of previous year.
Total and CEO outstanding options are normalized by total shares outstanding.
Actual
RP= I &
DIV 7 = 0
RP= I &
DIV ? = I
RP = 0 &
DIV ? = 1
RP = O &
DIV ? = 0
Total
I
Table 13: Robustness Checks of Link Between Option Programs,
CEO Compensation and Share Repurchases
Dep. Variable = REPURCHASES in 95 / ASSETS at end of 1994
Coefficients from Tobit specification are reported
Total Outstanding .243 .209 .210 .224
Options / Shares (.073) (.060) (.058) (.059)
Outstanding
Ratio of CEO -.021
Options to Total (.025)
Options
Market Value of -.00021
Stock Underlying (.00015)
CEO Options /
Annual Salary
Top 5 Officer -.278
Outstanding Options (.204)
/ Shares Outstanding
Ratio of Exercisable .026
Options to Total (.012)
Outstanding Options
Scaling Factor for .405 .413 .410 .533
Marginal Effect
Individual ownership, investment, cash flow, Tobin's q, cash on hand, debt, price appreciation,
and firm market value are also included in the specifications, but the coefficients are not
reported.
Scale factor for computing marginal effects is calculated at the means of the covariates.
Table 14: Stock Option Exercises during 1994
Coefficient from Quartile Regression of % A in Shares Outstanding during 1994
upon (Option Exercises / Shares Outstanding)
Median 25 th percentile
Option Exercises/ 1.019 1.154 .116 .599
Shares (.064) (. 140) (.487) (.275)
Outstanding
Other Controls No Yes No Yes
Sample Size 816 744 816 744
Investment, cash flow, Tobin's q, cash on hand, debt, price appreciation, industry effects, and
firm market value during 1994 are the other controls. Data on stock option exercises was not
provided for 1 1 of the 827 firms.
Standard errors for quartile regressions are estimated by bootstrap resampling (500 iterations).
Table 15: Option Exercises for S & P 100 & Dow Jones Firms 1993-1997
Coefficient from
Median Regression of
(Option Exercises * $ Share Repurchases % A in Shares
closing price) / during year / Outstanding upon
Market Value Market Value Option Exercises /
beginning of year beginning of year Shares Outstanding
1993 .007 .009 .993
(.069)
1994 .005 .012 .385
(.119)
1995 .011 .027 .333
(.137)
1996 .012 .019 .509
(.187)
1997 .015 .025 .442
(.256)
Sample includes 98 of the 108 firms currently listed in the S & P 100 and/or the Dow Jones
Industrial indices. Eight banks and utilities are excluded, as are CBS and Columbia/HCA
Healthcare (do not have data on option exercises over the past five years).
Appendix
Other Characteristics of 827 Firms Drawn
from Forbes, S & P 500, and MidCap 400 at end of 1994
Mean & std. deviation Median 10th - 90th%
Member of S & P 500 .49
at end of 94 (.50)
Member of .37
MidCap 400 (.48)
at end of 94
Market Capitalization 4046 1548 413 - 8567
at end of 1994 in $M (8146)
Lagged .077 .062 .011 - .147
Investment / (.067)
Assets(t- 1)
Lagged .118 .114 .029- .251
Cash Flow / (.086)
Assets(t- 1)
Tobin's q 1.77 1.49 1.05 - 2.76
(.93)
Cash Balance(t-1) / .091 .044 .006 - .245
Assets(t-1) (.124)
Long-term Debt(t-1) / .194 .168 .006 - .403
Assets(t- 1) (.173)
Price Appreciation .000 -.022 -.306 - .294
Over 1994 (.296)
Return in 1995 .260 .229 -.161 - .653
(including dividend) (.427)
Return in 1995-96 .509 .404 -.186 - 1.189
(including dividend) (.744)
___
Correlations Between Variables
Total CEO Indiv. Invest- Cash A Log
Option Option Own ment Flow q Cash Debt Price (size)
Total Options / 1.00
Shares Outstand.
CEO Options / .54 1.00
Shares Outstand.
Individual -.16 -. 10 1.00
Ownership
Lag Investment / .04 -.02 -.06 1.00
Assets
Lag Cash Flow / -.01 -.08 -.11 .41 1.00
Assets
Tobin's q .09 -.03 -.04 .22 .66 1.00
Cash on Hand / .28 .06 -.03 -.04 .16 .38 1.00
Assets
Long-term Debt -.03 .05 .04 .05 -.25 -.22 -.32 1.00
/ Assets
Price .07 .00 -.13 .05 .33 .34 .21 -.09 1.00
Appreciation
Log(VALUE in -.18 -.26 .00 .03 .22 .22 -.06 -.03 .15 1.00
millions of $)
Sample by Industry Group
Broad Industry Group 2-digit SIC # of firms % of sample
Mining/Construction 10- 19 46 5.6
Manufacturing 20- 39 443 53.6
Transportation/Public Service 40 - 49 61 7.4
Wholesale/Retail Trade 50 - 59 123 14.9
Finance/Insurance 60 - 69 87 10.5
Nonfinancial Services 70-79 67 8.1
2-digit SIC groups with more than 25 firms in sample
28 (Chemicals & Allied Products) 74 firms,
35 (Industrial, Commercial Machinery, & Computer Equipment) 64 firms,
63 (Insurance Carriers) 58 firms, 36 (Electrical Equipment) 43 firms, 73 (Business Services) 34 firms,
20 (Food and Kindred Products) 32 firms, 38 (Measurement Instruments, Photo. Goods, Watches) 31 firms,
48 (Communications) 30 firms,
27 (Printing, Publishing, & Allied Products), 33 (Primary Metal Industries),
and 37 (Transportation Equipment) 28 firms
Notes: The sample consists of all publicly traded companies which were a member of the S & P
500 or the MidCap 400 at the end of 1994, or were included in one of the May 1995 Forbes 500
lists (sales, profits, assets, and/or market value). Corporations in highly regulated industries,
such as banks and utilities are excluded. Firms which do not have data in Compustat in 1995 or
for whom CEO options and/or total outstanding options are unavailable are dropped. Firms must
also have institutional ownership data available at the end of 1994.
Total options outstanding and transactions during the year are obtained from annual reports to
shareholders or 10-Ks at the end of fiscal year 1994. CEO options outstanding and salary data
are obtained from proxy statements or 10-Ks filed at the end of fiscal year 1994.
Standard & Poor's Security Owner's Stock Guides provide institutional ownership data. The S &
P data cover investment companies, banks, insurance companies, college endowments, and
"13F" money managers. Thus, direct individual ownership excludes household holdings of
corporate equity through mutual funds or pension plans.
Investment is capital expenditures for property, plant, and equipment (Compustat annual data
item 30). Cash flow is income before extraordinary items (Compustat annual data item 20) plus
depreciation (Compustat annual data item 14). Cash on hand is defined as cash and short-term
investments (Compustat annual data item 1). Long-term debt is Compustat annual data item 9.
Tobin's q is the market value of common and preferred stock plus total liabilities divided by total
assets, all measures at the end of 1994. Total liabilities and total assets reflect book values.
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Figure 3: Ratio of Options Outstanding to Shares Outstanding
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Figure 4: Ratio of CEO Option Holdings to Total Options Outstanding
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Figure 5: Ratio of Top 5 Officer Options to Total Options
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Figure 6: Distribution of Direct Individual Ownership of Firms
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ESSAY TWO
Do Pension Plans with Participant Investment Choice
Teach Households to Equitize?
I thank Jeff Brown, Courtney Coile, Peter Diamond, Jonathan Gruber, Jerry Hausman, and Jim
Poterba for useful comments. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the
National Institute on Aging through the National Bureau of Economic Research is gratefully
acknowledged.
The past two decades has seen a dramatic shift in private pension plans. In 1975, 39% of
the workforce was covered by a defined benefit pension plan and only 14% was covered by a
defined contribution plan (U. S. Department of Labor (1997)). Eighteen years later, defined
contribution plan coverage is nearly 37% while about one in four workers have a defined benefit
plan. Workers now play a more active role in providing for their retirement through work.
Many defined contribution plans, most notably 401(k) s, allow participants to control the level of
contributions and in some cases direct how assets are invested. While much attention has been
given to how such retirement plans affect the level of saving (Poterba, Venti, & Wise (1996),
Engen, Gale, & Scholz (1996)), little research has addressed how they affect a household's
composition of saving or portfolio decisions. Given the substantial equity premium observed in
the United States this century, the question of how people save is as relevant as the amount they
save.
My hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, retirement plans in which workers are given a
choice as to how assets are invested provide financial education to workers they may not
otherwise receive. Having to decide between investing in a stock or bond fund, seeing first hand
the current and historical return performance of equities versus fixed income securities, and
realizing the relative ease with which investments in stocks can be made today (mutual funds, e-
trade, etc.) may cause workers to hold equity outside of their retirement plan. Defined
contribution plans where the employer makes investment decisions, or formula plans which
depend on years of service, wage, age, etc. don't offer this education component.
Bernheim (1993) concludes that the baby boom generation is saving only about one third
the amount necessary to maintain their consumption level in retirement. If one is concerned
about the amount of wealth that will be available for retirement, one must be concerned not only
about the level of saving, but also to the extent to which financial assets are held in equities. Any
program, such as retirement plans with participant choice of investments, which alters
perceptions of the "riskiness" or difficulty of investing in stocks could have important
consequences for household consumption during retirement.
Understanding the spillover effects of participant choice is also motivated by the debate
concerning Social Security reform. Many Social Security privatization plans (e.g., Gramlich,
Scheiber, Forbes) call for universal saving accounts to either replace or complement the existing
program, with individuals having a choice between equity and bond funds similar to the Federal
Employees' Thrift Plan.
To better understand the effect of participant choice plans upon own-account portfolios, it
is useful to first examine how the finances of households with various types of pension coverage
differ. Working households can be covered by various retirement plans. Some are formula
based (defined benefit or DB), while others are account based (defined contribution or DC).
Within the universe of DC plans, some allow workers discretion as to how contributions are
invested while others do not. Some households may be covered by multiple plans of various
types.
Of particular interest is how own-account asset levels and composition vary across
households with different retirement plan coverage. I will then exploit variation in the extent to
which workers have a choice as to how assets in a retirement plan are invested to test whether an
"education effect" is present. Ceteris paribus, do the portfolios and equity holdings of
households who must decide how to invest their pension assets differ from those who do not? If
so, are the differences attributable to the education received by being "forced", perhaps for the
first time, to make investment decisions (How do I allocate contributions among stock and bond
funds?)?
The answer to the first question is affirmative, as households in DC plans with participant
choice as to how funds are invested hold more of their own-account assets in stock than do
households in DC plans without choice. The answer to the second question is more difficult.
One has to be concerned that differences in own-account portfolios simply reflect financially
savvy and risk-taking individuals selecting into jobs with DC plans where workers have a choice
as to how assets are invested or financially savvy workers requesting that employers provide
participant-directed pension plans. Of course participation in pension plans is not a natural
experiment, and rather reflects a conscious decision. By focusing on a segment of the population
I classify as "financially unsavvy", I argue that the results obtained can be identified as an
education effect. This suggests, at least for this segment of the population, that pension plans
with choice provide education which impacts household portfolio decisions, leading to a higher
probability of owning stock outside of the DC plan. While it is difficult to quantitatively
extrapolate the magnitude of this "education effect" to the population at large, such a change in
asset composition could have significant impacts on future wealth, given the equity premium
observed historically in the United States.
The paper will proceed as follows. Basic details of pension plans are provided in Section
1. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on retirement plans and saving, education and saving,
and behavioral economics. There I also motivate why we should care not only about if people
save but how they save by briefly discussing the equity premium observed in the United States.
Section 3 describes the Survey of Consumer Finances, the primary data set used for this study,
and provides demographic and financial attributes of households with different retirement plan
coverage. The estimation strategy for determining if plans with participant choice in investment
provide an education component which causes households to change the composition of their
non-retirement account financial assets will be presented in Section 4. That section also presents
results. Robustness checks such as focussing attention on 401 (k) plans, testing for substitution
between retirement account and own-account stock holdings, and seeking corroboration from an
additional data source follow in Section 5. Section 6 offers conclusions.
I. Basics of Pension Plans
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to first give a brief review of the characteristics
of different retirement plans offered by employers. This section draws heavily from the Bassett,
Fleming, & Rodrigues (1998) survey based on the 1993 Current Population Survey, the EBRI's
Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs, and The 401(k) Plan Handbook.
Employer sponsored retirement plans can generally be categorized as formula based
(defined benefit or DB) or account based (defined contribution or DC). Defined benefit or
formula plans have declined in importance in recent years, however, a sizeable fraction of the
workforce, roughly 25%, is still covered by a DB plan. The typical DB plan provides a lifetime
nominal annuity at retirement, with the benefit being a function of years of service, highest
salary earned, etc.. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) provides insurance to
pension plans which satisfy ERISA requirements. The employer faces minimum funding
requirements based on actuarial liabilities which accrue to the pension plan and is responsible for
any gain/loss which occurs to the retirement funds.
Defined contribution plans have steadily grown in importance as a retirement saving
vehicle. Examples of DC plans are money purchase plans, profit sharing plans, ESOPs, thrift or
savings plans, TIAA-CREF, and 401 (k)s. Employers make contributions to an individual
account based on employee salary, employee contributions, employer match, and/or employer
profits. The worker is responsible for gains and losses which accrue in the account. There is no
guarantee of account performance and PBGC does not provide insurance. Account balances are
generally portable if you leave your job. There are a number of margins upon which DC plans
can vary. Some plans allow the employee to borrow against the account, or withdraw funds in
case of emergency. The extent to which workers have any discretion over the amount
contributed to the DC plan or how the money is invested also varies. This paper will exploit
variation in the degree to which investments are participant-directed.
The most common DC arrangement, 401 (k) plans, accounted for over 2/3 of total DC
contributions in 1993. Aggregate 401 (k) contributions alone exceed annual contributions to DB
plans. A 401 (k) is a salary reduction plan (an agreed upon reduction in employee's salary is
used to finance the retirement account). It effectively started in 1982 after IRS clarification of its
tax treatment. Unlike most other DC plans, contribution decisions are usually at the employee's
discretion. The GAO (1997) reports that 1993 Form 5500 filings indicate that 65% (73% when
weighted by assets and 73% when weighted by participants) of 401 (k) plans with 100 or more
participants were participant-directed. The employer will typically match employee
contributions by making further contributions on the employee's behalf. The typical match is
50%, ending when employee benefits reach 6% of salary (Buck Consultants (1994)). Employee
contributions are capped at $10,000 and total contributions are limited to the minimum of
$30,000 or 25% of salary starting in 1998. Non-discrimination rules insure that DC benefits are
distributed relatively evenly across income levels of the firm's workers.
Hybrid plans, the most popular of which is the cash balance plan, combine characteristics
of both DC and DB plans. However, the U. S. Department of Labor (1994) reports only 3% of
full-time defined benefit plan participants in medium and large private establishments were cash
balance plans.
This paper will compare the own-account asset holdings of households covered by a DC
plan in which they decide how the assets are invested to the own-account portfolios of
households covered by a DC plan without choice. It should be noted that roughly half of the
workforce does not participate in a retirement plan (Bassett, Fleming, & Rodrigues (1998)).
Thus caution must be exerted when trying to extrapolate any results obtained from the workforce
covered by a retirement plan to the population as a whole.
II. Literature Review and Equity Premium
2.1 Literature Review
This study draws from the literatures on retirement plans and saving, education and
saving, and behavioral economics. This work is unique in the respect that it focuses upon the
composition of saving rather than upon the level of saving. The historical returns available to
investors presented below indicate that the composition question is just as important as the level
question.
Research into pension plans and saving dates back at least to the work of Katona (1965)
and Cagan (1965) who observed that those with pension plans save more directly than those
without. This relationship runs counter to the predictions of a simple life-cycle model in which
pension wealth should offset private wealth dollar for dollar. They attribute this finding to
"education" or "recognition" effects, thus positing that saving preferences are endogenous. Of
course, this interpretation is easily discounted because of saving heterogeneity across the
population.
Since then, many researchers have further analyzed the relationship between pension and
non-pension wealth. Gale (1995, p. 6) provides a review of this work and concludes that, "taken
at face value, the literature shows little offset between pensions and other wealth; most of the
studies suggest offsets of 20 percent or less, and almost half suggest either no offset at all or a
positive effect of pensions on other wealth." However, Gale argues such results are plagued by
multiple biases and after correcting for many of these finds relatively high levels of offset.
Gustman & Steinmeier (1998) address many of the concerns raised by Gale and find that
pensions cause little, if any, displacement of other forms of wealth for the cohort of 51 to 61 year
olds from the HRS. The one conclusion that can be drawn from this literature is that no strong
consensus has emerged regarding the spillover effects of pensions upon non-retirement account
finances.
A voluminous literature has studied what effect 401 (k) plans in particular have had on
household asset accumulation (see Engen, Gale, & Scholz (1996) and Poterba, Venti, & Wise
(1996)). This literature has not focused attention, however, on how 401 (k) plans may have
affected the composition of household wealth. Particularly relevant for my paper, this debate has
brought out the concern that employers offer 401 (k) plans to satisfy a workforce of innate
savers, or that employees who are pre-disposed to save seek out firms with pension plans
matching their preferences.
Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz (1996) (hereafter BBS), Bernheim & Garrett (1996)
(hereafter BG), and Bernheim, Garrett, & Maki (1997) (hereafter BGM) all study the impact of
direct financial education upon the level of saving. BBS & BG focus on investment education in
the workplace using surveys of firms and households, respectively. BBS find retirement
seminars increase contributions to savings plans. BG also find positive effects of financial
education upon both saving in general and saving for retirement in particular. They also find
evidence of spillover effects across spouses.
An inherent problem in interpreting their results is that the prevalence of a saving
program could be systematically tied to worker preferences. The direction of the bias is not
clear, though. Firms may provide investment education to satisfy the demands of a workforce
predisposed to save or firms with a segment of the workforce which is not predisposed to save
may be more apt to offer seminars in order to relax nondiscrimination rules. BBS and BG
present evidence that education is remedial, suggesting their results are biased downward.
BGM study the impact of education on saving decisions by exploiting cross-sectional and
time series variation in high school requirements for financial planning courses. They also
conclude direct education can influence financial decision-making.
The work of Bernheim and others suggest that direct education (e.g., seminars and
classes) may have important effects on saving behavior. None of the studies address how the
composition of assets is affected by investment education. This paper is also different from
previous work in that it studies whether the less direct "education" acquired simply through
having to allocate assets in an employer sponsored retirement plan impacts portfolio decisions.
This raises the key question: In actuality do workers who participate in a DC plan in which they
choose how the funds are invested receive any basic information about the options from the
employer, and do they have many investment options from which to choose?
Section 404 (c) of ERISA specifies when an employer is not liable for investment results
when he provides participant choice. The 404 (c) regulations require that the plan offer a broad
range of investment choices (at least three core options must present materially different
risk/return characteristics), allow participants to give investment instructions concerning the
three core options at least quarterly, and provide sufficient information for informed investment
choices. The Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994 & 1995) reports 73% of 401 (k)
participants are provided some educational material. Further, 92% of 401 (k) participants read
materials given by employers and 44% say doing so causes them to invest differently. Typical
investment options are corporate equity (sometimes a firm's own stock), guaranteed investment
contracts, U. S. government securities, corporate bonds, and balanced funds. The mean number
of investment options provided by employees is 5.4 (Buck Consultants (1994)), so there is some
choice to be made.
Benartzi & Thaler (1998) present evidence which casts some doubt on the financial
education 401 (k) participation provides. Looking at a database of retirement plans, the authors
find that the proportion of assets invested in stocks depends strongly on the proportion of stock
funds in the plan. At least in the sample of retirement plan participants they examine, there
appears to be a framing effect as assets chosen appear to depend on the make-up of the funds
offered in the plan. This suggests we might expect any spillovers to own-account investing to be
minimal. If participants continue to invest equally across all investment options provided,
regardless of characteristics, it is doubtful they have acquired any financial education that they
can apply to their non-retirement account finances. However, education need not occur only at
the time of the first allocation decision. Participants may split funds among alternatives initially,
and then adjust as they observe the pattern of returns across plan alternatives.
Similar in spirit to my paper, Papke (1998) also investigates the economic impact of
participant-directed retirement plans. However, her question of interest is distinct from mine.
She examines how asset allocation, participant contributions, and account balances within the
retirement plan differ across account based plans with and without employee investment choice.
Her preferred estimates indicate that participants with choice invest 15 percentage points more in
stocks and contribute almost 5 percentage points more in salary. She does not consider spillover
effects upon own-account assets. She also utilizes a different data source than this paper. Her
sample is drawn from the 1992 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women, which is a
sample of women aged 55-69 and their husbands.
At this point it is natural to ask, why should participation in a retirement plan with
participant choice alter worker's perceptions of risk and provide any financial education the
worker couldn't or shouldn't receive on his/her own? To answer this requires leaving the
rational agent paradigm and entering behavioral economics (see Thaler (1994) for a discussion of
psychology and saving behavior). Undoubtedly inertia, procrastination, or psychic costs provide
what are perceived by some households to be real impediments to investing more heavily or at
all in stocks.
Benartzi & Thaler (1995) propose a model in which investors gain utility not from wealth
levels but from returns, and households are loss averse. A household's attitude towards risk then
depends crucially upon the time horizon over which returns are calculated. For example, the
daily barrage of stock performance data and the much greater variability in stock returns over
shorter horizons could make stocks look unattractive. The "psychic" damage they inflict upon
the investor, who is evaluating performance on a daily basis, could outweigh the return premium.
In a behavioral economics context, participation in a retirement plan with participant
choice could have important repercussions. The plan may provide the household with asset
return performance data to utilize when deciding how to allocate contributions across fund
options it would or could not obtain otherwise. The employee will likely be presented with
historical performance of fund options over time periods from one to five years, and will be
provided with account balances on a quarterly basis. Lengthening the time frame over which
households evaluate performance, even slightly, will increase their willingness to equitize more
of their financial assets.
2.2 Equity Premium
At this point, I would be remiss if I didn't at least touch upon the equity premium, the
superior performance of stocks relative to bonds, since it helps motivate this research. To
demonstrate the equity premium available to investors, I look at historical returns 1871-1996.
Data from 1926-1996 is from Ibbotson (1996) and data from 1871-1925 is from Shiller (1989).
Stock returns are measured by the Standard and Poor's Index. This index was comprised largely
of railroad stock in the early part of the sample. High-grade corporate bond and Treasury bill
returns are available from 1926. To get a longer time series, I augment the Treasury bill series
with commercial paper returns which are available over the period 1871-1925.
I consider buy-and-hold strategies with a $1 initial investment. I assume all taxes on
returns are deferred, as is the case with pension plans. Table I compares investing in the S & P
index of stocks versus short-term Treasury bills/commercial paper (1871-1996) and investing in
stocks versus high-grade corporate bonds (1926-1996). Both the fraction of time stocks
outperform fixed-income securities and the median difference in terminal values of the portfolios
normalized by the median value of the fixed-income portfolio are reported.
The equity premium appears huge (around 6% per annum)! Over a 20 year investing
horizon, stocks have nearly always outperformed interest bearing securities and by a wide
margin. While the exact magnitude of the return premium of equities may depend on where one
starts the time series, the importance and existence of the equity premium cannot be disputed.
Of course, investors do not care only about mean returns, but the covariance of those
returns with their other assets and own consumption. Even in an expected utility framework,
researchers still observe a large equity premium puzzle. The reader should see Campbell, et al
(1997) and Siegel & Thaler (1997) for a review of this literature and other possible explanations
for the puzzle. This paper will not attempt to deal with the general equilibrium consequences of
increased investor rationality upon future equity returns.
While the extent to which equities will outperform bonds in the future, after adjusting for
risk, is an open question, it is clear that they have done so in the past by a wide margin. If the
pattern of return performance documented in Table 1 persists, it is clear that studying portfolio
composition decisions by households is important.
III. Data and Attributes of Households across Pension Plan Coverage
I use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). It is a cross-sectional survey taken
every three years by the Federal Reserve. The SCF oversamples the rich because asset
ownership is skewed, so weights are needed to convert sample averages to population
aggregates. The 1995 sample consists of 4,299 households. The SCF has detailed data on asset
ownership. It also asks questions concerning pension plan coverage and attributes and financial
preferences. The 1995 survey has new questions regarding whether the DC plan participant has
"any choices about how the money is invested" and whether those covered by a DB plan were
eligible but chose not to participate in a supplemental DC plan. The main disadvantage of the
SCF is that it is a cross-sectional data set and not a panel. Such commonly used data sets as the
Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), Health &
Retirement Study (HRS), and Survey of Income & Program Participation (SIPP) either lack
specific financial data, lack specific pension plan characteristics, and/or cover an age group that
excludes many working households.
My unit of observation is the household because the SCF provides asset data on a
household basis and Bernheim & Garrett (1996) show strong spousal spillover effects. The SCF
reports data for up to three pensions per person from his/her current job. I restrict my sample to
households where at least one spouse works for pay for an employer and where neither spouse is
65 or older. If the self-employed spouse of a worker sets up a retirement plan for the household,
that household is also dropped from the sample. The remaining sample reflects 54% of original
sample, 62% weighted.
Households now fall into one of five categories based on employer-provided retirement
plan coverage.
(1) household participates in a DC plan with investment choice, referred to as CHOICE
(34% of remaining sample, 32% weighted)
45% of these households are covered by just one plan and 31 % have a DB plan as well
(2) household participates in DC plan but none allow investment choice, referred to as
NOCHOICE (12% of remaining sample, 12% weighted)
65% of these households are covered by just one plan and 25% have a DB plan as well
(3) only have DB plan and not offered DC
(9% of remaining sample, 9% weighted)
(4) only have DB, turned down DC (6% of remaining sample, 7% weighted)
(5) no retirement plan (40% of remaining sample, 40% weighted)
Note that groups (1)-(4) could be covered by multiple plans. This is because the unit of
observation is the household. For example, both spouses may work and be covered. Also, some
employers offer multiple pension plans to individual workers. To belong to group (1), the
household must be covered by a pension plan in which they have control over investments. The
household may also be covered by DB plans or DC plans without choice. NOCHOICE
households participate in DC plan(s), none of which allow participants to di'ect investments, and
may also have a formula based pension.
A priori, a natural way to study if participant choice in retirement plans has any spillover
effect on own-account finances would be to compare households who participate in a DC plan
with choice to households who participate in a DC plan without choice in investments. Thus, to
best answer the question I am considering, I will focus attention on groups I and 2 and subsets of
these groups. For example, since households covered by multiple types of plans may allocate
assets in their portfolio differently that those without such protection, I also examine households
covered by just one DC plan (with or without participant-directed investments).
Due to the different nature of the pensions, one would expect the financial decisions of
DC with choice vs. DB only households to differ regardless of any education effect. For
example, a household with a generous DB plan may be more aggressive in own-account
portfolio decisions than a household with a 401 (k) only. The larger is the component of wealth
composed of "guaranteed" benefits (since future wages are stochastic the actual level of DB
benefits is not really guaranteed), the more a household may wish to increase exposure to risk
through own-account investment in stocks. Including households which have a DB plan and turn
down a DC plan in a control group is especially troublesome, as they have revealed a preference
not to participate. Finally, households with no pension plan coverage either are not offered a
retirement plan or choose not to participate in a firm's plan. Any conclusions drawn by
comparing the subpopulation of workers with no pension plan coverage to workers with
coverage are dubious given the clear differences between the two groups (both observable and
unobservable).
Table 2 shows the financial and demographic characteristics of households with various
types of retirement plan coverage. Statistics are weighted using 1995 population weights in the
SCF. The variables for the most part should be self-explanatory. The # of households represents
the number of households in the U.S. the specific subsample represents. Income represents
family income before any deductions or credits. Net worth represents the sum of financial and
non-financial assets less all debt outstanding. It does not include the PDV of defined benefit
plans, retirement account assets, or Social Security wealth. Financial assets refers to own-
account financial assets. It includes IRA assets but excludes DC plan assets. Stock is defined as
direct ownership of stock or stock mutual funds, excluding ownership through retirement
accounts (DC plans). As with financial assets, own-account stock includes IRA equity holdings.
Even though it may include IRA assets, I will occasionally refer to own-account assets or stock
holdings as non-retirement holdings. For purposes of this paper, retirement assets will be
defined as assets held in a DC pension plan. The ownership of stock on own-account is the key
variable of interest.
Age represents the maximum age of the spouses in the household. Female indicates
whether the household is headed by a female. College indicates whether either spouse has
attended at least four years of college.
The SCF asks how DC plan assets are invested. If the respondent answers "mostly or all
in stock" or "split between stock or interest earning assets," 100% or 50%, respectively, of the
account balance is assumed to be invested in stock. I report IRA assets conditional on having an
IRA. IRA stock holdings are determined in the same manner as DC plan stock holdings. The
reported mean share of financial assets, DC plan assets, or IRA assets invested in stock is the
average of each household's share (it is not weighted by assets).
I also create four variables to measure saving preferences and attitudes towards risk, both
of which may influence the willingness of a household to invest in stock. The SCF records
whether or not you have any IRA assets (the stock not the flow), and thus whether the household
has ever made any contributions. The SCF (Kennickell (1997)) also asks the following question
which concerns risk-aversion and thus willingness to invest in equities:
Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the
amount of financial risk that you and your (spouse/partner)
are willing to take when you save or make investments?
1. TAKE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN
SUBSTANTIAL RETURNS
2. TAKE ABOVE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN
ABOVE AVERAGE RETURNS
3. TAKE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN AVERAGE
RETURNS
4. NOT WILLING TO TAKE ANY FINANCIAL RISKS
I define the following three dummy variables: HAVEIRA (IRA assets > 0), LOVERISK
(answers I or 2 to the question), HATERISK (answers 4 to the question). Clearly HAVEIRA
indicates a predisposition to save. LOVERISK (HATERISK) represents a strong willingness
(aversion) to investing in risky assets like stocks.
The variable NOSAVER represents households that do not have IRA assets and are not
willing to take above average risks for above average returns. Thus,
NOSAVER = 1 - max(HAVEIRA, LOVERISK).
Not surprisingly, Table 2 demonstrates that households without any retirement plan
coverage have considerably less income and wealth, and are less apt to have a college education
or be headed by a married couple. The SCF reports whether or not households covered by a DB
plan have the option of participating in a supplemental DC plan. Somewhat surprisingly, among
DB plan covered households, households which turn down a supplemental DC plan are
essentially identical to those which are not offered one.
Households which participate in at least one pension plan in which they determine the
investments (CHOICE DC PLAN) are wealthier than households with DC plans without choice
(NO CHOICE DC PLAN), but have wealth levels comparable to households covered by defined
benefit plans only. Some differences in income and net worth across CHOICE vs. NOCHOICE
households is by construction, as CHOICE households will by definition be more apt to be
covered by multiple plans (1.8 vs. 1.4 plans for NOCHOICE), and will more likely be a two-
earner family. (Recall, a CHOICE household may also be covered by additional DB plans and
DC plans without participant choice, whereas a NOCHOICE household may have supplemental
DB plans but no DC plan which allows the participant to control investments.) However,
differences in mean income ($13.6K) and net worth ($65.5K) are still evident when the sample is
restricted to households with only one pension plan. There are no significant differences in age,
marital status, or college attainment across the households with different pension plans.
While households that have choice in how assets are allocated in pension plans hold more
equities on own account, which is consistent with the education hypothesis, they also differ in
important ways from no choice DC plan households. While the two groups are fairly similar
along demographic measures, households that participate in a DC plan with choice are somewhat
more well off than families whose DC plan does not allow investment choice. Restricting
attention to the subgroup of households covered by only one pension, 75 th percentile income and
net worth levels for the two groups are $60K vs. 50 and $113K vs. 79, respectively. However,
most stark are differences in IRA assets and saving preferences. For example, CHOICE
households are 70% more likely than NOCHOICE households to report being willing to take
above average risks to earn above average returns. They are also up to 50% more likely to have
set up an IRA account. These are obviously major concerns, which my estimation strategy must
address.
IV. Estimation Strategy and Results
Recall that the question of interest is whether there is an education component to DC
plans which require employees to choose how to invest retirement account assets which causes
households to change their own-account composition of financial assets. The basic regression
model I have in mind is:
(own stock) or (stock share) = Po + P1 * CHOICE + 32 * (SA VING/RISK preferences) +
33 * Finances + f4 * Demographics + e
Own stock is a dummy which is one if non-retirement account stock and stock mutual fund
holdings exceed $1000 and stock share is the share of non-retirement financial assets held in
stocks or stock mutual funds. CHOICE indicates whether the household participates in at least
one plan where investments are participant-directed.
The basic "experiment" I'm considering is whether, among households with a DC
pension, those who direct investment of plan assets are more apt to own stock on own-account
relative to those who do not. In the broadest test, CHOICE households are those which are
covered by at least one pension plan where they determine how funds are invested. They may
have additional DC plans with or without choice and supplemental DB plan coverage as well.
The "control" group, for whom CHOICE is zero, will be households participating in at least one
DC plan and perhaps covered by a defined benefit plan. However, none of these DC plans allow
the participant to direct the investment of assets. Thus, both CHOICE and NOCHOICE
households have some provision for retirement through work, but only CHOICE households
have input into how the retirement account is managed. As a more refined "experiment", I will
also test if there is any education or spillover effect on own-account investing by focussing on
households with only one pension plan which is either a DC plan with investment choice or a DC
plan without investment choice.
Net worth and current income are included in the specification to reflect that wealthier
households can absorb more risk. The same reasoning justifies the inclusion of a "have DB
plan" dummy to reflect that having a defined benefit package in addition to the DC plan may
alter risk-taking and desired own-account portfolios. Age should also be a key explanator. A
popular rule of thumb is that the percentage of one's portfolio invested in equities should be 100
minus one's age (Bodie, Merton, & Samuelson (1992) provide theoretical support for decline in
exposure with age). Stock ownership may also decline with age because of cohort effects such
as proximity to the Great Depression. College education, marital status, and the sex of the head
of the household may also influence saving preferences and risk tolerance.
The key difficulty is how do we measure saving/risk tolerance preferences properly? By
omitting controls for them, we introduce a serious omitted variable bias into the results. Perhaps
the correlation between CHOICE and equity ownership on own-account reflects a correlation
between omitted saving/risk taking preferences, which manifests itself in the CHOICE
coefficient. This endogeneity could result from workers either selecting jobs which offer or
demanding current employers provide retirement plans matching their saving preferences.
Papke (1998) finds that participant choice and plan knowledge are not strongly or
significantly correlated among NLS Mature Women respondents. She offers this as evidence
that choice is not endogenous. However, the differences in saving and risk tolerance preferences
across pension types warrant concern about endogeneity.
There are two related econometric strategies one can pursue.
(1) Find proxies that account for saving/risk tolerance preferences
(2) In essence create a "natural experiment" by defining a control group that is otherwise similar
to the experimental group, except for exposure to choice in pension plans
4.1 Regressions of Stock Ownership
I first adopt strategy (1), and estimate regressions of stock ownership as a function of
demographic and financial characteristics of the household, with HAVEIRA, LOVERISK, &
HATERISK serving as proxies for saving preferences and risk tolerance.
Tables 3 & 4 display the estimation results for the ownership and share of financial assets
regressions, respectively. Because Probit coefficients are difficult to interpret, coefficients are
transformed to reflect marginal changes in probability for a household with "average"
characteristics. The reported results are not weighted (weighting observations with the
population weights change the coefficients very little).
From looking at simple tabs, heterogeneity in households across pension types was
evident (notable difference in saving/risk tolerance measures), suggesting some selection may be
going on. This is manifested somewhat in Table 3, as we see how the inclusion of saving
measures and financial and demographic factors reduces the impact of the CHOICE variable by a
third when the control and experimental groups are defined most broadly. The marginal effect of
CHOICE on the probability of owning equity on own-account falls from 25 percentage points to
17 after including saving, risk tolerance, financial, and demographic explanators. Nonetheless,
investment choice in the DC plan still appears to have a substantive impact on households' own-
account portfolios. The estimated marginal effect of CHOICE, which is .17, is still not much
less than the observed difference in the probability of owning stock on own-account between the
choice and NOCHOICE households, which is .23.
Estimates for the financial and demographic characteristics are generally as expected in
the ownership regressions of Table 3. Age, financial status, and college education are
consistently important determinants of equity ownership. The estimates imply that, relative to
the 30-39 cohort, 60-64 households are nearly 19% points less likely to hold stock on own-
account. This could reflect an age effect and/or a cohort effect (see Poterba & Samwick (1997)
for evidence on this issue). We see monotonic increases in equity ownership as income and net
worth increase. For example, a household with income exceeding $150K is I 1% points more
likely to own equity relative to a household in the 50-75K bracket and a household with wealth
exceeding $500K is 30% points more likely to own equity relative to a household in the 50-100K
bracket. A college educated household is significantly more likely to own stock outside of the
retirement account. Having defined benefit plan coverage as well increases equity ownership,
but the effect is somewhat small and insignificant. IRA ownership is a very strong and
significant predictor of owning stock outside of one's pension plan. The estimated marginal
increase in stock ownership probability associated with having an IRA is 40% points! Similar
conclusions are drawn when I focus on households with one pension plan.
The net worth and income variables are to some extent endogenous. Equity ownership
may lead to higher income through dividends and capital gain realizations. I thus included labor
income as opposed to total income in the regressions and obtained virtually identical results. The
coefficients on net worth dummies are difficult to interpret as they reflect both that wealthy
households are more apt to hold stock and that, given the equity premium, households that
invested in stock are wealthier. However, the inclusion of the net worth variables does not alter
the coefficient of interest, namely the impact of CHOICE.
In some couples, the husband has exposure to a retirement plan with investment choice,
while in others the wife does. Are there differential impacts on a household's asset allocation
depending on which spouse has the DC plan with CHOICE? Focussing on married couples
covered by one pension plan, the marginal effect on the probability of own-account stock
ownership is .215 (.075) when the husband has the DC plan with CHOICE, controlling for all
other household characteristics. This is very similar to the effect when the wife has the DC plan
with choice (marginal effect is .227 (.091)).
4.2 Regressions of Share of Assets in Equities
Table 4 presents regression estimates for the share of financial assets held in equities. I
present both marginal effects derived from a Tobit specification and estimates of a linear model
conditional on ownership of stock. I report both because the education hypothesis I have
outlined above has predictions regarding the ownership decision, but offers no prediction
regarding the amount of stock held conditional on ownership. The education hypothesis
suggests investing retirement funds at work may have spillover effects which cause households
to start to invest own-account assets in the stock market. Unless stock holdings were inherited
and left unattended, it is doubtful, conditional on owning stock, that having a say in how pension
assets are allocated will provide much additional education. Thus, conditional on ownership we
should not expect CHOICE to matter. The type of DC plan may impact stock holdings,
conditional on ownership, if DC plans without choice invest funds in a systematically
undesirable way that is offset by households adjusting own-account portfolios. I address this
possibility below in Section 5.
This prediction is born out both in the summary statistics of Table 2 and in the regression
results of Table 4. Back in Table 2, the CHOICE households were more than twice as likely as
NOCHOICE households to own stock on own-account, however, the stock share conditional on
ownership was the same across the two groups. Analogously, while the Tobit specification
yields significant positive impacts of CHOICE, this is totally driven by the ownership decision.
Conditional on ownership, participation in a CHOICE plan has no significant effect on the level
of non-retirement account equity holdings, and the effect estimated over one plan households is
negative. I obtained qualitatively similar results when the net worth controls were excluded. For
the remainder of the paper I will focus on stock ownership, as that is where we would predict
educational spillovers to occur.
4.3 Results Focussing on "Financially Unsavvy"
Even after including the other controls in the specification, the estimated impact of
CHOICE on equity ownership is still significant and substantive. The open question is do the
other variables, particularly HAVEIRA, soak up all of the "financial savvy" which could explain
a correlation between CHOICE and stock ownership? In other words, does the estimated
CHOICE coefficient in the full specification represent a pure education effect, or is it still
contaminated by endogeneity?
To obtain results which are less apt to suffer from the endogeneity argument, I follow the
second econometric strategy. I estimate regressions only on the subgroup households for whom
NOSAVER is one. A priori we would expect these households to be "financially unsavvy."
Thus, I drop all observations of households that report IRA assets (HAVEIRA=1) or report they
are willing to take above average risks to obtain above average returns (LOVERISK=1). These
households, for whom NOSAVER is zero, are likely to have a predisposition to save and a
willingness to invest in equities, even without exposure to participant-directed retirement plans.
This strategy may seem dubious at best, as I am selecting on preferences which are
potentially endogenous. Isn't this going to bias the results obtained on the selected sample? The
answer is probably yes. However, I argue that the bias works against detecting any education
effect, as it will tend to bias the estimates downward.
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose DC plans with participant choice
do provide education which impacts household portfolios and changes saving preferences and
risk tolerance. Further suppose that the household has no pension plan coverage in 1989, but is
covered by a DC plan with participant choice in 1992. The researcher only observes the
household in 1995.
1989 1995 Comment
saver saver this is group of households predisposed to save, want to exclude
nosaver saver this is group of households for whom "education" effect is largest
nosaver nosaver this is group for whom "education" effect is smallest
saver nosaver unlikely
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What I am essentially doing by selecting on the NOSAVER variable is throwing out
those predisposed to save (which confound interpretation of the CHOICE coefficient) and
throwing out those for whom the "education" effect of the retirement plan is the largest. I am
left with households for whom the potential education effect of participant choice plans is
smaller. Remember, these are people with no IRA assets who also report they do not take above
average risks to earn above average returns. Thus, the results J obtain for this group should be
downwardly biased. A zero coefficient on the choice variable does not imply there is no
educational component from DC plans with CHOICE as we are looking at individuals who are
predisposed not to save and not to invest in stock. Narrowing the sample to this group, however,
makes extrapolating the results to the whole population for policy purposes difficult.
Table 5 reports characteristics of households across the different types of pension plans
(CHOICE and NOCHOICE households in general and then among households with just one
plan). The sample is again weighted using 1995 population weights in the SCF. Notice how the
CHOICE and NOCHOICE groups are much more comparable in virtually every category except
equity ownership on own-account (but this is OK because this is the variable we are trying to
explain). Among households covered by one DC plan, the average values of income, net worth,
DC plan assets, and all demographic characteristics of households in participant-directed plans
are statistically indistinguishable from those in plans without choice. Particularly striking is that
the level of stock holdings in retirement accounts are very similar across DC plans with and
without choice.
Table 6 reports regression results, analogous to Table 3 but estimated on the "financially
unsavvy" only. The point estimates still suggest big education spillover effects from participant
choice (7-8 percentage point change in probability of owning equity on own-account) for this
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subpopulation. The marginal impact of the CHOICE variable changes by only 2.2 (.8 when
focus on one plan group) percentage points when I add financial and demographic characteristics
to the specification (the regression with CHOICE as the only regressor is not reported in Table
6). The financial and demographic explanators are statistically important to the model (p-value
of .00 for exclusion test), but their impact on equity holdings is largely independent of the
CHOICE effect. This is not a shock, given the similarities across groups shown in Table 5.
How do we interpret the various estimates of CHOICE upon equity ownership obtained
using the full sample vs. the "financially unsavvy" subsample? That depends on the question at
hand. If you are concerned about what effect switching to a retirement plan with investment
choice is likely to have upon household portfolios for hru-tseholds without a predisposition to
save, then the results in Table 6 likely provide a lower bound for the "true" education effect.
If instead you are concerned with the average effect of CHOICE on equity ownership for
the population of DC plan participants as a whole, then the results in Table 6 are less informative
and Table 3 is most relevant. By focussing solely on NOSAVERS during the estimation, Table 6
excludes households for whom the education effect is the strongest, but also excludes households
which already are predisposed to save and thus receive no additional education from a retirement
plan with choice. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate these results to the fragment
of the population not covered by a pension. Nonetheless, regardless of the specific magnitude,
CHOICE accounts do appear to potentially impact the financial decisions of households in a
substantive way.
V. Robustness Checks
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While suggestive of an education effect, legitimate concerns can be raised with the results
and their interpretation. Robustness checks and a discussion of possible pitfalls follow below.
5.1 Other Relevant Differences Across Choice and No-Choice Plans?
The key argument I can raise against the results is that DC plans can differ along other
margins besides whether investment choice is allowed. For example, there may be a difference
in the decision to participate across DC plans with and without choice. Suppose firms which
offer plans without investment choice require mandatory participation (e.g., a certain % of salary
is invested in company stock). Suppose firms which offer DC plans with participant-directed
investments allow the employee to choose whether he participates. This could obviously present
a problem, as the CHOICE coefficient could simply reflect the unobservables of who selects into
the plan more so than the presence of investment choice. Perhaps these differences in DC plan
characteristics vary across industry or occupation groups in a way that biases the CHOICE
coefficient. However, including industry and occupation dummies in the regressions (results not
reported) reduces the marginal impact of CHOICE by less than two percentage points for the
whole population and less than one point when focusing on the "financially unsavvy."
One has to argue that there is an unobserved heterogeneity among this financially
unsavvy group which is uncorrelated with demographic and financial characteristics of the
household which caused the worker to voluntarily participate in the DC plan with choice.
Nonetheless, comparing a worker who voluntarily participates in a retirement plan with one who
is forced to is less convincing than comparing two workers who voluntarily decided to contribute
to a retirement plan, one of which happened to allow participants to make investment decisions
while the other did not.
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Tables 7a & 7b list the prevalence of various DC plans by whether the participant
controls investments. Differences emerge once we categorize plans by participant choice. For
example, 401 (k) / 403 (b) plans comprise 68-77% of plans offering investment choice, but only
37-45% of plans without choice, depending on the population we examine. Profit sharing plans
and employee stock ownership plans comprise a larger share of no choice plans relative to choice
plans. To the extent that these plans differ systematically along other margins besides whether
investment choice is allowed, this could potentially present a problem.
To address this concern, I restrict attention from the universe of DC plans to focus just on
401 (k) plans. The majority of 401 (k) plans offer employees multiple investment options in
order to avoid liability and attract contributions. However, as detailed earlier in Section 1, 27%
of 401 (k) s weighted by participants do not allow employees to direct investments. For the four
samples I consider, the percent of 401 (%;) plans without investment choice ranges from 22-28%.
"The essential feature of a 401 (k) plan is the right of an eligible employee to elect to have the
employer make contributions to the plan (elective contributions) or to receive them in cash" (The
401 (k) Plan Handbook, p. 336). Thus, by focussing on 401 (k) plans, worker discretion in
deciding whether or not to participate should not vary across plans which do or do not allow
participants to direct investments. It is worth mentioning that non-elective contributions may
occur to satisfy non-discrimination rules (firm makes contributions for non-contributing low-
income workers to ease constraint on high-income workers). I would not expect this activity to
vary systematically across plans with or without investment choice.
Table 8 presents stock ownership regression results when I require that a DC plan be a
401 (k) / 403 (b). Results are generally similar to those obtained by looking at all types of
account based plans, however precision is sacrificed on many covariates due to the substantial
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reduction in sample size. The probability of equity ownership is estimated to be 12-14
percentage points higher for "financially unsavvy" 401 (k) participants who direct investments
relative to 401 (k) participants with no choice, with the marginal effects being significant.
5.2 Portfolio Rebalancing
To this point I have ignored that households may want to balance their holdings of asset
types across retirement and non-retirement accounts. This could be tax-motivated, because taxes
on accrued income in retirement accounts are deferred until withdrawal (see Shoven (1997)). Or
it could simply reflect that households have target levels of interest bearing assets and equity
they wish to achieve, and they are willing to adjust retirement account assets and/or own-account
balances to achieve the desired targets. For example, suppose all households have the same
desired holding of stock. Also suppose pension plans in which the worker has no choice how
funds are invested put all the money into company stock. We would then expect the own-
account holdings of households with pension plans with participant choice to be composed more
of equities relative to those covered by the pension plans controlled by the employer. The
correlation between CHOICE and own-account stock holdings need not reflect any education
spillover, but could simply occur due to such portfolio rebalancing.
I don't believe this could be driving the CHOICE coefficient. First, the equitization of
pension plan assets is actually fairly similar whether or not the worker gets to direct the
investment (see Tables 2 and 5). Roughly 30% of CHOICE and NOCHOICE households report
most or all of their retirement plan is invested in stock. Second, I included as extra covariates the
fraction of retirement account assets held in the form of stock and dummies for the size of a
household's DC plan balance relative to its non-retirement account financial assets. Besides
picking up a substitution effect, the coefficient on the degree of equitization of DC plan assets
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could also reflect household preferences and risk tolerance. The dummies for the ratio of
retirement to non-retirement financial assets are included because the larger is this ratio, the less
important it is for a household to worry about how it handles its own-account portfolio and
perhaps the less likely it is to own stock outside its pension plan.
I find (results are reported in Tables 9) that the marginal effect of CHOICE is essentially
unchanged after adding the new regressors. Bodie & Crane (1997) document a positive
correlation in asset composition across accounts when examining TIAA-CREF participants. I
also find little evidence for portfolio rebalancing as the equitization of retirement account assets
is positively and significantly correlated with non-retirement stock ownership. The strong
correlation disappears, however, when we focus on the NOSAVER or financially unsavvy
households. This suggests that the extent of equitization in retirement plans helps proxy for
preferences and risk tolerance that carry over to own-account portfolios. The results also
indicate that for households for whom the DC plan is a large component (>80%) of total
financial wealth, the less apt is stock ownership on own-account (10 - 30% points). Of course,
this could just be a mechanical result as near zero non-retirement account holdings will imply a
large DC plan / financial assets ratio and zero own-account stock ownership. To combat this
built in correlation I re-estimated the regression for households with non-retirement financial
assets in excess of $20K and found the same pattern in coefficients.
5.3 Results using Health and Retirement Study
To corroborate my findings using the SCF, I conducted the same analysis using the 1992
Wave 1 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a panel study conducted every two
years starting in 1992. In 1992 the households it interviewed had respondents in the age range
51 - 61. The households in the HRS will be older than those in the SCF and generally not as
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well-off. Table 10 displays the marginal effect of CHOICE over various samples. The results
generally confirm earlier findings with the SCF. It is important to note that the HRS stock
outside DC plan measure also includes stock held through investment trusts but omits stock held
in IRA accounts. This omission likely explains the lack of precision, relative to the results using
the SCF, for the CHOICE coefficient in some of the regressions estimated over the whole
sample. Among "financially unsavvy" households, the marginal effect of allowing participant
investment choice on stock ownership is 5-16 percentage points.
5.4 Other Concerns
Finally, my last two concerns cannot be addressed by re-examining the data. They
concern the generalizability of the results obtained. First, is the apparent "education" unique to
this period? Do/will we see similar spillover effects in other periods? "Learning" is likely
enhanced when annual stock returns are 25%+. Second, how well can the results be extrapolated
beyond the narrow segment of the population I focus on ("financially unsavvy" households
covered by pension plans). How should we expect the segment of the workforce currently not
covered by any retirement plan to respond if partial privatization of Social Security occurs and
universal 401 (k)-type accounts are introduced?
Throughout the paper, marginal effects evaluated at the "average" household have been
reported and discussed. Table 11 shows the distribution of the predicted impact of directing
pension plan investments upon the probability of holding stock on own-account across
"financially unsavvy" households covered by a DC plan. Rather than use the estimated
coefficients to compute a marginal effect for the "average" household as before, I instead
calculate the implied impact of CHOICE for each household who currently does not direct
investments. The estimated mean and median increases in probability suggest that a large
fraction of the difference in own-account stock ownership between households in participant-
directed plans vs. households in DC plans without choice may be do to an education/spillover
effect.
VI. Conclusion
Motivated by Social Security privatization proposals and the equity premium, this paper
studies whether DC plans with participant choice of investments offer financial education.
Specifically, are households that make decisions regarding pension plan investments more apt to
hold more equity on own account relative to households whose pension plan assets are controlled
by the employer? Evidence from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances suggests the answer is
yes. Robustness checks were made to test whether hypotheses other than the education effect
could explain the observed correlation between CHOICE and own-account stock ownership.
None could explain the results.
If this education/spillover effect is real, what is driving it? Are workers able to self-
educate simply by observing the repercussions of their investment choices (learning by doing)?
Or do participant-directed plans also provide more or better retirement education through
seminars and reading materials which facilitates changes in financial behavior both inside and
outside the retirement plan? Somewhat surprisingly, seminars, newsletters, and summary plan
descriptions are nearly as common among firms with defined benefit plans as firms offering
401 (k)s in the sample of firms Bayer, Bernheim, & Scholz (1996) examine. Better
understanding of what really educates plan participants and drives changes in financial behavior
is needed.
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This paper has focussed attention on one specific component of pension plans, namely
control of pension plan investments. Another relatively new development in retirement plans is
the ability to borrow against the account balance. The 1995 SCF suggests that 55% of account
based pension plans allow such loans. Future work will study to what extent participants borrow
against account balances and whether such an allowance eases liquidity constraints or simply
leads to imprudent borrowing against provisions for retirement.
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Table 1: Long-term performance of stocks vs. other securities
Stocks vs. short-term bills
(1871-1996)
Stocks vs. corporate bonds
(1926-1996)
Stocks Win
Median diff.
in value /
(Median value
of bills)
86/122 .28
92/117 .45
103/107 .82
87/87 6.0
Stocks Win
Median diff.
in value /
(Median value
of bonds)
Sources: Ibbotson (1996) provides returns 1926-96 and Shiller (1989) provides returns 1871-
1925.
Stock return is return on S & P Index. "Stocks Win" is the fraction of time stocks outperform
fixed-income securities. The median difference in terminal values of the portfolios (stocks less
fixed-income) normalized by the median value of the fixed-income portfolio is also reported.
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5 years
10 years
20 years
40 years
52/67 .28
50/62 .67
49/52 2.21
32/32 14.8
Table 2: Income, Net Worth, & Demographics of Households with Various Pension Plans
# obs
# households
Income
25 th- 7 5 th %
Net Worth
25 th- 75 th %
Financial
2 5 th- 7 5 th %
Own Stock
> $1000
Stock/Fin
Stock/Fin
given own
stock
Age
Married
Female
College
NO
CHOICE CHOICE
DC PLAN DC PLAN
779 272
19.8 M 7.1 M
65.0 45.2
(3.4) (2.3)
35 - 74 26- 57
155.0 96.5
(21.5) (17.8)
18- 134 12- 98
71.2 34.4
(15.0) (11.8)
3.1 -49 1.4- 23
.39 .16
(.02) (.02)
.20 .10
(.01) (.01)
.45 .41
(.01) (.04)
41.3 40.6
(.4) (.6)
.74 .73
(.02) (.03)
.17 .19
(.01) (.02)
.47 .39
(.02) (.03)
1 NO
1 CHOICE CHOICE
DC PLAN DC PLAN
344 174
8.9 M 4.6 M
54.8 41.3
(5.7) (3.0)
30 - 60 22 -50
142.6 78.3
(38.2) (23.9)
14- 113 8.5- 79
66.1 26.7
(26.7) (16.9)
2.1 -29 1.1 - 18
.33 .12
(.03) (.02)
.18 .08
(.02) (.02)
.48 .42
(.02) (.05)
40.6 39.5
(.6) (.7)
.64 .67
(.03) (.04)
.24 .22
(.02) (.03)
.41 .37
(.03) (.04)
DB ONLY
DB, TURN
DOWN DC
200 143
5.5 M 4.1 M
51.2 52.8
(4.8) (3.4)
28 - 63 31 - 68
140.8 137.5
(29.7) (37.2)
21 - 165 23- 144
49.5 55.0
(10.4) (30.7)
2.5 - 37 1.7- 34
.23 .24
(.03) (.04)
.11 .13
(.02) (.02)
.43 .48
(.03) (.05)
44.0 43.0
(.7) (.8)
.71 .66
(.03) (.04)
.19 .19
(.03) (.03)
.36 .47
(.03) (.04)
Data source is the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and reported statistics are weighted to
reflect the population. See text for variable definitions.
Mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
"Stock/Fin" is the average of the ratio of stock holdings to financial assets.
Note: IRA assets are reported conditional on ownership.
NO PLAN
920
24.5 M
32.9
(2.2)
14-40
103.2
(25.5)
2.5 - 72
36.2
(13.6)
2.6-11
.15
(.01)
.09
(.01)
.47
(.02)
38.9
(.4)
.61
(.02)
.25
(.01)
.26
(.01)
Table 2 (continued): Retirement Plan Assets and Saving Preferences
of Households with Various Pension Plans
# obs
# households
DC Plan
Assets
2 5 th- 7 5 th %
Share plan
in stock
% plans
mostly or
all stock
# Pension
Plans
Have DB
IRA Assets
2 5 th"- 7 5 th %
Share IRA
in stock
Have IRA
Love Risk
Hate Risk
NOSAVER
NO
CHOICE CHOICE
DC PLAN DC PLAN
779 272
19.8 M 7.1 M
38.6 16.8
(4.7) (2.0)
3.1 -38 1.6- 20
.60 .53
(.01) (.02)
.32 .33
(.02) (.03)
1.8 1.4
(.03) (.04)
.31 .25
(.02) (.03)
42.6 20.8
(9.9) (7.3)
5.0- 38 3.0- 20
.57 .31
(.03) (.05)
.36 .24
(.02) (.03)
.29 .16
(.02) (.02)
.23 .39
(.01) (.03)
.48 .65
(.02) (.03)
1 NO
1 CHOICE CHOICE
DC PLAN DC PLAN
344 174
8.9 M 4.6 M
18.7 12.2
(3.6) (1.6)
2.2 - 20 1.3 - 12
.57 .49
(.02) (.03)
.38 .31
(.03) (.04)
1 I
0 0
50.9 19.4
(22.0) (10.7)
4.0- 30 3.0- 20
.58 .21
(.04) (.06)
.34 .25
(.03) (.03)
.29 .17
(.02) (.03)
.25 .39
(.02) (.04)
.50 .63
(.03) (.04)
DB, TURN
DB ONLY DOWN DC
200 143
5.5 M 4.1 M
1.2 1.2
(.03) (.04)
1 1
33.0 29.7
(5.5) (9.5)
6.0- 35 3.5- 28
.40 .38
(.06) (.07)
.29 .26
(.03) (.04)
.17 .09
(.03) (.02)
.40 .31
(.03) (.04)
.64 .69
(.03) (.04)
NO PLAN
920
24.5 M
35.5
(6.8)
3.2- 30
.49
(.03)
.18
(.01)
.17
(.01)
.49
(.02)
.70
(.02)
Table 3: Regressions of equity ownership outside DC plan
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
Households may have more than 1 plan Households with only one plan
CHOICE .246 .180 .167 .220 .170 .177
(.031) (.037) (.040) (.040) (.045) (.047)
Have Ira .511 .375 .508 .404
(.028) (.037) (.041) (.054)
Love Risk .057 .0g 4 .025 -.029
(.040) (.043) (.053) (.056)
Hate Risk -.214 -. 135 -. 128 -.029
(.040) (.046) (.053) (.064)
Have DB .027
(.041)
Income 25-50 .129 .058
(.073) (.079)
Income 50-75 .160 .127
(.084) (.104)
Income .238 .178
75-150 (.091) (.128)
Income 150+ .265 .340
(.105) (.148)
NW 50-100 .143 .114
(.056) (.077)
NW 100-250 .226 .199
(.056) (.086)
NW 250-500 .281 .171
(.070) (.128)
NW 500+ .447 .406
(.066) (.116)
Age 30-39 -.066 -.073
(.060) (.072)
Age 40-49 -.095 -. 153
(.062) (.071)
Age 50-59 -. 127 -. 196
(.068) (.070)
Age 60-64 -.256 -.244
(.064) (.055)
Married -.031 -.072
(.065) (.080)
Female .001 .009
(.075) (.087)
College .125 .123
(.040) (.053)
Log -687.8 -517.4 -459.4 -319.5 -239.5 -210.2
Likelihood
Sample Size 1051 1051 1051 518 518 518
Observed .418 .418 .418 .342 .342 .342
Probability
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Note: All regressors are indicator variables, so the marginal effect of variable i is estimated by
D( X .i P- + 0i) - 0( X -i P-i ) where Pi is the Probit coefficient corresponding to variable i and X.i
and p-• are vectors of regressor means and the corresponding Probit coefficients excluding
variable i. This transformation is done to all Probit coefficients in subsequent tables.
In left panel, sample is all households with a DC plan (can have multiple plans and DB plan). In
right panel, sample is restricted to households covered by only one pension plan which is a DC
plan. CHOICE = I if the household participates in a plan where they choose investments.
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Table 4: Regressions of equity holdings outside DC plan
Dep. Variable = share of financial assets held in stock
Marginal effect evaluated at sample means reported for Tobit model
May have more than one plan Households with only one plan
Tobit Cond. on Eq. > 0 Tobit Cond. on Eq. > 0
CHOICE .059 .044 .059 -.069
(.009) (.052) (.008) (.091)
Have Ira .172 .108 .162 -.203
(.010) (.125) (.013) (.218)
Love Risk .018 .036 .009 .102
(.014) (.030) (.018) (.057)
Hate Risk -.078 -.083 -.036 .023
(.021) (.074) (.026) (.087)
Have DB .011 -.008
(.017) (.030)
Income 25-50 .068 .070 .036 -.022
(.023) (.076) (.024) (.094)
Income 50-75 .077 .048 .032 -.005
(.028) (.088) (.032) (.111)
Income .107 .110 .047 .011
75-150 (.024) (.099) (.029) (.133)
Income 150+ .103 .098 .081 -.032
(.040) (.108) (.049) (.171)
NW 50-100 .056 -.024 .054 -. 134
(.020) (.067) (.022) (. 109)
NW 100-250 .065 -.073 .057 -.225
(.017) (.078) (.032) (.124)
NW 250-500 .082 -.038 .054 -. 151
(.038) (.089) (.074) (.135)
NW 500+ .130 .003 .111 -.269
(.034) (.118) (.046) (.193)
Age 30-39 -.018 .025 .003 .062
(.029) (.056) (.037) (.083)
Age 40-49 -.059 .003 -.060 .103
(.032) (.072) (.040) (.123)
Age 50-59 -.074 .000 -.087 .108
(.035) (.083) (.047) (.147)
Age 60-64 -. 148 -.083 -.138 .137
(.046) (.124) (.060) (.217)
Married -.015 -. 103 -.003 -.015
(.031) (.054) (.037) (.081)
Female .030 -.027 .051 .054
(.034) (.067) (.037) (.103)
College .059 .064 .061 -.022
(.016) (.046) (.024) (.082)
Inv. Mills Ratio - .108 - -.335
(.212) (.311)
Log Likelihood -583.0 Adjusted R2 = .017 -284.0 Adjusted R7 = -.032
Sample Size 1051 497 518 206
In left panel, sample is all households with a DC plan (can have multiple plans and DB plan). In
right panel, sample is restricted to households covered by only one pension plan which is a DC
plan. CHOICE - 1 if the household participates in a plan where they choose investments.
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Table 5: Income, Net Worth, & Demographics of NOSAVERS with Various Pension Plans
# obs
# households
Income
2 5th-- 7 5 th %
Net Worth
2 5 th- 7 5 'th %
Financial
2 5 th- 7 5 th %
Own Stock >
$1000
Stock/Fin
Stock/Fin given
own stock
Age
Married
Female
College
CHOICE
DC PLAN
NO CHOICE
DC PLAN
313 162
9.5 M 4.6 M
49.5 40.3
(2.1) (2.6)
30 - 60 22 - 51
71.4 61.0
(16.0) (15.8)
11 - 86 8.7 - 67
27.3 16.0
(15.6) (8.6)
1.4- 19 1.0- 14
.17 .07
(.02) (.02)
.10 .04
(.01) (.01)
.42 .32
(.04) (.06)
40.6 40.0
(.6) (.8)
.70 .69
(.03) (.04)
.19 .21
(.02) (.03)
.31 .35
(.03) (.04)
I CHOICE
DC PLAN
I NO CHOICE
DC PLAN
145 102
4.4 M 2.9 M
40.0 35.6
(1.5) (3.6)
27 -47 20-44
65.3 46.4
(33.6) (20.4)
6.2- 71 6.8 - 58
27.6 10.5
(33.4) (11.8)
1.1- 12 .8- 11
.14 .05
(.03) (.02)
.09 .03
(.02) (.01)
.46 .32
(.06) (.07)
39.5 38.9
(.8) (.9)
.60 .61
(.04) (.05)
.27 .27
(.04) (.04)
.28 .32
(.04) (.05)
Data source is the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances and reported statistics are weighted to
reflect the population. See text for variable definitions.
A household is a NOSAVER if it has no IRA assets and does not report it is willing to take
above average risks to earn above average returns.
Mean is reported for all variables and the standard error of the mean is in parentheses.
"Stock/Fin" is the average of the ratio of stock holdings to financial assets.
119
Table 5 (continued): Retirement Plan Assets and Saving Preferences
for NOSAVER with Various Pension Plans
# obs
# households
DC Plan Assets
2 5 h"-7 5 th %
Share plan in
stock
% plans mostly
or all stock
# Pension Plans
Have DB
IRA Assets
2 5 th"- 7 5 th %
Share IRA in
stock
Have IRA
Love Risk
Hate Risk
NOSAVER
CHOICE
DC PLAN
NO CHOICE
DC PLAN
313 162
9.5 M 4.6 M
24.8 15.7
(2.8) (2.5)
2.5 - 30 1.7 - 20
.55 .52
(.02) (.03)
.24 .30
(.02) (.04)
1.8 1.5
(.05) (.05)
.29 .25
(.03) (.03)
- -
0 0
0 0
.38 .51
(.03) (.04)
1 1
1 CHOICE
DC PLAN
1 NO CHOICE
DC PLAN
145 102
4.4 M 2.9 M
12.2 10.4
(1.3) (1.6)
2.0- 15 1.2- 12
.51 .49
(.03) (.04)
.29 .29
(.04) (.05)
1 1
0 0
- -
0 0
0 0
.40 .52
(.04) (.05)
1 1
Note: IRA assets are reported conditional on ownership.
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Table 6: Regressions of equity ownership outside DC plan for "NOSAVERS"
(NOSAVERS have no IRA assets and are not willing to take above average risks)
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have more than one plan Households with one plan
CHOICE .077 .072
(.031) (.037)
Have Ira
Love Risk
Hate Risk -.032 .008
(.033) (.038)
Have DB -.002
(.035)
Income 25-50 .098 .065
(.056) (.052)
Income 50-75 .135 .172
(.087) (.120)
Income 75-150 .262 .170
(.124) (.168)
Income 150+ .088 .330
(.149) (.341)
NW 50-100 .133 .088
(.057) (.065)
NW 100-250 .204 .151
(.068) (.100)
NW 250-500 .400 .272
(.131) (.334)
NW 500+ .532 .433
(.159) (.236)
Age 30-39 -.027 -.005
(.045) (.050)
Age 40-49 -.091 -.097
(.043) (.044)
Age 50-59 -.079 -.056
(.039) (.045)
Age 60-64 -.089 -.067
(.041) (.052)
Married .041 .016
(.050) (.056)
Female .075 .059
(.082) (.080)
College .072 .067
(.038) (.049)
Log Likelihood -173.7 -77.2
Sample Size 475 247
Observed Probability .164 .126
In left panel, sample is all households with a DC plan (can have multiple plans and DB plan). In
right panel, sample is restricted to households covered by only one pension plan which is a DC
plan. CHOICE = 1 if the household participates in a plan where they choose investments.
Table 7a: Prevalence of various DC plans by whether participant controls investments
DC plans
NOCHOICE
Plan is household's
CHOICE
only pension
NOCHOICE
Table 7b: Prevalence of various DC plans by whether participant controls investments
for "NOSAVER" households
(NOSAVERS have no IRA assets and are not willing to take above average risks)
DC plans
NOCHOICE
Plan is household's only pension
CHOICE NOCHOICE
401 (k) / 403 (b)
Thrift / Saving
Profit Sharing
Employee Stock
Ownership
Other
68%
13
9
5
5
37% 77% 40%
Other includes such DC plans as IRA-SEP, TIAA-CREF, money purchase plans, and tax-
deferred annuities.
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All
CHOICE
All
CHOICEI iI I I
Table 8: Regressions of equity ownership outside DC plan
(require that DC plan must be a 401 (k) / 403 (b))
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have more
All
than one plan
NOSAVERS
Households
All
with only one plan
NOSAVERS
CHOICE .274 .135 .227 .115
(.055) (.032) (.061) (.037)
Have Ira .428 .442
(.049) (.062)
Love Risk .027 .019
(.058) (.070)
Hate Risk -. 178 -.040 -. 104 -.029
(.064) (.033) (.078) (.035)
Have DB .091 .000
(.059) (.038)
Income 25-50 .225 .138 .170 .096
(.101) (.073) (.107) (.063)
Income 50-75 .203 .179 .148 .159
(.117) (.152) (.138) (.174)
Income .260 .308 .199 .262
75-150 (.124) (.208) (.158) (.259)
Income 150+ .325 .473 .319 .605
(.141) (.321) (.187) (.448)
NW 50-100 .162 .076 .081 .015
(.079) (.063) (.098) (.052)
NW 100-250 .140 .101 .180 .025
(.077) (.076) (.103) (.069)
NW 250-500 .096 .360 .107 .348
(.108) (.234) (.148) (.454)
NW 500+ .364 .171 .362 .164
(.110) (.241) (.157) (.300)
Age 30-39 -. 129 -.050 -.035 .005
(.077) (.038) (.091) (.049)
Age 40-49 -. 167 -.095 -. 157 -.037
(.079) (.041) (.087) (.046)
Age 50-59 -.112 -.037 -. 133 .020
(.093) (.045) (.100) (.081)
Age 60-64 -.250 -.063 -.256
(.090) (.031) (.070)
Married -.021 .011 -.018 -.009
(.091) (.054) (.105) (.064)
Female -.005 .001 .051 .003
(.102) (.068) (.119) (.066)
College .154 .052 .127 .042
(.055) (.043) (.067) (.049)
Log Likelihood -239.7 -76.9 -141.0 -44.1
Sample Size 551 233 337 152
Observed .425 .150 .362 .12
Probability
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Table 9: Regressions of equity ownership outside DC plan
(controls for % of DC plan invested in stock &
size of DC plan relative to own-account financial assets)
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have more than one plan
All NOSAVERS
Households
All
with only one plan
NOSAVERS
CHOICE .170 .078 .168 .063
(.040) (.028) (.046) (.033)
Stock / balance .182 .056 .146 .021
for DC plan (.052) (.041) (.063) (.045)
DC plan assets /
Financial assets
> .25 & < 1 .014 .021 -.041 -.019
(.047) (.042) (.056) (.039)
> 1 & < 4 -.066 -.004 -. 123 -.041
(.050) (.040) (.055) (.036)
> 4 -.236 -.114 -.254 -.115
(.051) (.034) (.054) (.038)
Sample Size 1051 475 518 247
HOUSEHOLD MUST HAVE OWN-ACCOUNT FINANCIAL ASSETS > $20K
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Marginal changes in probability from Probit model reported
May have more than one plan Households with only one plan
All NOSAVERS All NOSAVERS
CHOICE .169 .161 .188 .083
(.058) (.060) (.086) (.109)
Stock / balance .206 .133 .260 .118
for DC plan (.063) (.094) (.102) (.151)
DC plan assets /
Financial assets
>.25 & < 1 .093 .118 .072 .197
(.056) (.101) (.093) (.192)
> 1 & < 4 .006 .085 .007 .055
(.064) (.099) (.114) (.176)
>4 -.275 -.233 -.303 -.251
(.079) (.078) (.133) (.120)
Sample Size 672 217 271 82
Full specification was estimated. Coefficients for other explanators are not reported.
Note: Financial assets do not include DC plan assets.
Table 10: Regressions of equity ownership outside DC plan
(data source is 1992 Wave 1 Health & Retirement Study (HRS))
Dep. Variable = have own-account stock > $1000
Only the marginal change in ownership probability from CHOICE is reported
Probit model is assumed
Estimates from full specification over all households
May have more than one plan Households with only one plan
Any DC plan 401 (k) only Any DC plan 401 (k) only
CHOICE .046 .091 .040 .124
(.031) (.050) (.046) (.073)
Sample Size 1317 555 393 185
Estimates from full specification over NOSA VER households
May have more than one plan Households with only one plan
Any DC Plan 401 (k) only Any DC Plan 401 (k) only
CHOICE .074 .156 .052 .097
(.036) (.052) (.043) (.048)
Sample Size 570 228 214 93
CHOICE = 1 if the household participates in a plan where they choose investments.
All sample inclusion rules used earlier apply here as well. HRS variables are generally defined
exactly the same as those constructed from the SCF. The HRS stock outside DC plan measure
also includes stock held through investment trusts but omits stock held in IRA accounts. The
omission of stock ownership through IRAs likely explains the lack of significance of the
CHOICE coefficient in some of the regressions estimated above over the whole sample. The
HRS does not ask a question regarding risk-tolerance, so the variables LOVERISK and
HATERISK cannot be constructed. Thus, in the HRS sample, a NOSAVER is a household with
no IRA assets.
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Table 11: Ownership of stock outside of DC plan for NOSAVERS
The implied marginal impact of CHOICE for the "financially unsavvy"
Difference in
ownership prob.
relative to
households with
CHOICE
Estimated effect of CHOICE on ownership for household
which currently does not direct DC plan investments
Mean Median 2 5 "h - 7 5 "h %
May have more
than one plan
Any DC plan .097 .068 .059 .034 - .100
401 (k) only .177 .137 .079 .033- .211
Households with
just one plan
Any DC plan .093 .068 .063 .031 - .096
401 (k) only .137 .106 .074 .021-.156
Marginal effects are calculated for each NOCHOICE household using underlying Probit
coefficients obtained from full specifications reported in Tables 6 & 8. The reported distribution
of marginal effects is weighted to reflect the relevant population.
Recall a NOSAVER or "financially unsavvy" household by my definition has no IRA assets and
reports it is not willing to take above average risks to earn above average returns.
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ESSAY THREE
Capital Gains Tax Rules, Tax-Loss Trading, and Turn-Of-The-Year Returns
(joint with James M. Poterba)
We are grateful to John Campbell, Jerry Hausman, Terry Shevlin, Stanley Zin, and two
anonymous referees for helpful comments, to Andrew Mitrusi for assistance with the NBER
TAXSIM files, and to the National Science Foundation and Smith-Richardson Foundation for
research support. This research was carried out using the NBER Asset Pricing database.
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The unusual behavior of stock returns at the turn of the calendar year is one of the most-
studied empirical regularities in financial economics. A variety of explanations have been
offered for the abnormally high returns that have been observed historically on the last days of
December and first days of January. Some focus on the annual cash flow patterns to institutional
investors or on the incentives that year-end reporting requirements place on these investors.
Others suggest that the income tax system facing individual investors may induce tax-loss selling
and therefore affect turn-of-the-year returns. Because realized capital losses can be used to
reduce taxes on realized gains or other income in the calendar year in which they are realized,
taxpayers have an incentive to realize capital losses before year-end. Such tax-loss selling could
produce year-end selling pressure in shares that have experienced losses before year-end; if this
selling pressure abates after the turn of the year, the prices of these shares might rise, thereby
contributing to higher returns after the turn of the year.
In one of the classic studies of the turn-of-the-year effect, Roll (1983) describes this tax-
loss selling explanation. He then notes that "If investors realized that such a pattern were
persistent, they would bid up prices before the end of the year and there would be no significant
positive returns after January first... [however], we are obliged to test every theory, even one so
patently absurd as this, by the empirical strength of its predictions... (p. 20)" His empirical
evidence suggests that the turn-of-the-year return is related to the return over the previous year,
as the tax-loss-selling explanation would suggest. Firms that experience more negative returns in
one year display larger January returns in the next. There is now a substantial body of research,
including Dyl (1977), Branch (1977), Slemrod (1982), Reinganum (1983), Lakonishok and
Smidt (1986), Ritter (1988), Dyl and Maberly (1992), Eakins and Sewell (1993), Sias and Starks
(1997), and Reese (1998), that suggests that individual investors are sensitive to tax
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considerations in their year-end stock trading. These empirical findings suggest that the
"absurd" tax-based explanation must be given serious consideration, even though a definitive
link between tax-motivated trading behavior and turn-of-the-year stock returns has yet to be
established.
For example, a number of studies have tested for turn-of-the-year return anomalies in
countries without capital gains taxes. These include pre-1973 Canada (Berges, McConnell, and
Schlarbaum (1984)), pre-1965 Great Britain (Reinganum and Shapiro (1987)), and the pre-1917
United States (Schultz (1985), Jones, Pearce, and Wilson (1987), and Jones, Lee, and Apenbrink
(1991)). These studies provide mixed evidence on the importance of tax-loss selling in
contributing to turn-of-the-year return behavior. However, the finding a turn-of-the-year return
effect in a country without a capital gains tax does not imply that tax-loss selling does not
contribute to observed turn-of-the-year returns in countries with a capital gains tax. It simply
implies that other factors also contribute to such return patterns.
One difficulty in evaluating the tax-loss-selling hypothesis is that many of its predictions
coincide with an alternative model, the "window dressing" hypothesis for institutional investors.
In particular, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis and the "window dressing" hypothesis suggested by
Haugen and Lakonishok (1987) and Lakonishok, et al. (1991) yield similar predictions for stock
returns and volume around the turn of the year. The window dressing hypothesis suggests that
institutional investors sell shares with recent price declines prior to year-end or quarter-end,
when they must disclose their portfolio holdings, so they are not shown holding poorly
performing stocks.
This paper presents new evidence on the link between tax-loss selling and turn-of-the-
year returns. It exploits changes over time in the structure of capital gains taxes to generate
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predictions about the correlation between previous losses and year-end tax loss selling. A
substantial previous literature, including Constantinides (1984), Chan (1986), and Sims (1995),
discusses optimal stock trading strategies when short- and long-term capital gains are taxed
differently. Constantinides (1984) demonstrates that when there are no distinctions between
long-term and short-term gains, and when there are no transaction costs, there should be no
increase in tax-loss selling at year-end. Losses should be realized as they occur. In the presence
of transactions costs, however, and under tax regimes that make short-term losses more valuable
to investors than long-term losses, it may be optimal for investors to realize their losses just
before they become long-term, or just before the turn of the year, whichever comes first.
There have been changes over time in the length of time that assets must be held to
qualify for long-term capital gains treatment and in the incentive to realize short-term losses in
excess of realized gains. Over the past three decades, the holding period for long-term gains and
losses has fluctuated between 6 and 12 months, with changes occurring in 1977, 1978, 1984, and
1988. The fraction of long-term losses that can be deducted from non-gain Adjusted Gross
Income (AGI) has changed twice in the postwar period. The 1969 tax reform reduced the
fraction from 100% to 50%. It was raised from 50% to 100% in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In
a setting with transaction costs, such tax changes would affect optimal tax-loss-selling behavior.
Changes in the holding period alter the set of previous returns that would be most important for
determining the amount of year-end tax-loss selling. Lowering the fraction of long-term losses
deductible against AGI strengthens investors' incentive to realize short-term losses. If tax-
motivated trading is an important determinant of turn-of-the-year stock returns, then the tax
changes may provide an opportunity to uncover a link between such trading and these returns.
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Chan (1986), DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), and Simms (1995) also study the link
between January returns and both recent and historical losses. Our study extends this work by
focussing on differences in the coefficients on long-term and short-term loss realization potential
under different tax regimes. We also investigate how the definition of the holding period for
short-term gains and losses affects the link between past returns and turn-of-the-year returns.
Our empirical strategy is to use changes in the capital gains tax rules to generate testable
predictions in the relationship between lagged returns and turn-of-the-year returns. Unlike many
previous studies, our tests have some power to distinguish between window dressing and tax-loss
selling. Changes in capital gains taxation apply to individual investors but not to the untaxed
institutions such as pension funds and universities. If tax loss selling by individual investors
does not contribute to year-end selling pressure, then changes in the capital gains tax rules should
be inconsequential for turn-of-the-year returns. A relationship between these tax rules and turn-
of-the-year returns, however, provides some evidence that tax loss selling contributes to January
returns.
The paper is divided into four sections. Section one describes the capital gains tax
provisions in the federal income tax code that bear on realization decisions. Section two
describes the data that we analyze and presents summary information on turn-of-the-year returns
over the time period 1963-1996. The third section presents our results on the effect of holding
period changes, and changes in the share of long-term losses that can be deducted from AGI, on
the relationship between lagged returns and turn-of-the-year returns. There is a brief conclusion.
I. Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Loss Selling
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The capital gains tax in the United States has changed many times in the postwar period.
Tax rates, the length of the holding period that qualifies assets for long-term gains treatment, the
fraction of long- and short-term losses that can be deducted against non-gain AGI, and the dollar
limit on the losses that can be deducted from AGI have all been modified. This section begins
by summarizing the tax incentives for realizing short-term losses at year-end, then describes
changes in the capital gains tax law, and concludes with a discussion of the number of taxpayers
who were most affected by the reforms.
1.1 Incentives for Tax Loss Selling
Previous studies, notably Chan (1986) and Reese (1998), have derived conditions under
which an investor will find it optimal to realize a short-term capital loss before year-end, rather
than wait until after the turn of the year and realize the loss, possibly as a long-term loss.
Realization timing decisions will depend upon the magnitude of the loss, the expected turn-of-
the-year return, the discount factor reflecting deferring realization, and short-term and long-term
capital gains tax rates. The larger the difference between the short-term and long-term capital
gains tax rates, the greater the incentive for short-term realization before the turn of the year.
However, the end of December does not mark the switch from short to long-term tax
status for the majority of investors. So why should lc'zs realizations, particularly short-term, be
concentrated at year-end? First, the investor may have realized gains that allow full use of the
tax deduction which results from a loss realization. If the investor has both short and long-term
gains to offset, it may be worthwhile to realize short-term losses before the end of December.
The investor may not have short-term gains to offset next year (short-term losses are less
valuable if deducted against long-term gains). Second, the failure to realize a loss by the end of
the calendar year delays the tax savings by a year. For those investors who are able to
distinguish short and long-term losses on their tax returns, the higher tax rate on short-term assets
suggests short-term losses are more likely to be worth realizing at year-end than long-term
losses.
1.2 Capital Gains Tax History
Table I summarizes the income tax provisions that affect capital gains taxation over the
period 1942-1996. It focuses on changes in the long-term holding period and the percentage of
long-term losses deductible against AGI. The 1969 Tax Reform Act reduced the fraction of
long-term capital losses that could be deducted from AGI from 100 percent to 50 percent
effective January 1, 1970. Short-term losses were fully deductible against AGI both before and
after the 1969 tax reform, and there was a $1000 limit on the total losses that any taxpayer could
claim. The 1969 rule was in force until 1986, when another tax reform returned to the pre-1969
rule on loss deductibility. This limit probably makes the long-term loss provision more
important for small investors than for large ones.
The 1969 restriction on losses offsetting other income was weakened in 1976. When the
1969 reform took effect, long-term losses were defined as those on assets held for more than six
months. This definition was modified by the 1976 Tax Reform Act, which raised this holding
period to nine months for 1977 and twelve months for years after 1978. This holding period
change was reversed in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which reduced the long-term holding
period to six months for assets purchased between June 22, 1984 and the end of 1987. As a
result of changes enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the long term holding period has been
twelve months since 1988.
Restrictions on the use of long-term losses to offset other types of income, such as those
in effect from 1970 to 1986, give investors incentives to recognize losses while they are short-
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term. In the presence of transaction costs, changes in the definition of the holding period, and in
the nature of the loss-offset rules should affect investor behavior.
Our empirical results relate turn-of-the-year returns to previous-year stock performance
over the period 1963-1996. We divide this thirty-four-year span into three regimes with regard
to capital gains taxation, and then test whether the pattern of turn-of-the-year returns over the
three regimes is consistent with tax-motivated trading.
Regime I includes years when the long-term holding period was six months and long-
term losses were just as valuable as short-term losses for reducing AGI. This covers Januaries in
1963 through 1969, as well as 1988, since 1987 has similar tax rules to the earlier period.
Regime II includes January returns from 1970-1976 and 1985-1986, when the holding period
was six months, and long-term losses were only half as valuable as short-term losses for reducing
AGI. In this regime, the tax loss-selling hypothesis predicts that losses during the second half of
the calendar year should have a larger effect on turn-of-the-year returns than losses that accrued
earlier in the year. Regime III includes the years with a twelve month holding period. This
includes the Januaries in 1979-1984 and 1989-1996. In this regime, six-month and six-to-twelve
month lagged returns should both help to predict December selling and subsequent turn-of-the-
year returns. Losses on securities purchased during the first as well as the second half of the year
can be realized as a short-term loss at year-end when the holding period is twelve months.
We leave the January returns for three years out of our analysis. January 1977 and
January 1978 mark transitions from six to nine, and nine to twelve month holding periods,
respectively. These transitions reduce the selling pressure in December 1976 and December
1977 that would otherwise have been associated with six and then nine-month holding periods.
January 1987 is a transition from 50% to 100% deductibility of long-term losses. This transition
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reduced the selling pressure in December of 1986 that would otherwise have been associated
with 50% deductibility of long-term losses.
The tax loss-selling hypothesis predicts that when the holding period is six months and
long-term losses are only partially deductible, losses in the first half of the year should have a
weaker effect on turn-of-the-year returns than losses between July and December. One reason
returns from the first half of the year would have less of an impact on January returns when the
holding period is six months is that losers from the first half of the year would have had to have
been sold much earlier than year-end to obtain short-term tax treatment. The hypothesis also
predicts that when the holding period is twelve months, losses in the first and second halves of
the year should have more similar effects on turn-of-the-year returns. Our empirical work is
directed at evaluating these predictions. Recall that these changes in capital gains taxation apply
to individual investors but not to the untaxed institutions such as pension funds and universities.
If tax loss selling by individual investors does not contribute to year-end selling pressure, then
these changes in the capital gains tax rules should be inconsequential for turn-of-the-year returns.
1.3 Number of Taxpayers Impacted by Reforms
The substantive importance of differential deductibility for long-term and short-term
losses depends on the pattern of loss realizations, because capital gains and losses are "netted"
against each other before they are added to, or subtracted from, adjusted gross income. For some
taxpayers, this "netting" makes the different statutory treatment of long-term and short-term
losses irrelevant. For example, consider a taxpayer with long-term gains in excess of short-term
losses. This taxpayer would effectively face the long-term capital gains tax rate on incremental
short-term loss realizations, since such losses would reduce net taxable long-term gains. The
only taxpayers who face different tax rates on short-term losses and long-term losses are those
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who have both net short-term and net long-term losses, or those who have both net short-term
and net long-term gains.
The Treasury Tax Model data provide some information on the importance of such
taxpayers. In 1970, for example, the first year when long-term losses were only 50% deductible,
taxpayers with both long- and short-term gains or long- and short-term losses reported 14 percent
of the dividends reported by taxpayers with gains or losses. This fraction has increased slowly
over time. It remained reasonably stable throughout the 1970s, rose in the early 1980s, for
example to 22 percent in 1981, and rose again in the mid- 1980s. There was a sharp increase in
1986, to 33 percent, but the values in the late 1980s were also higher than in previous years. In
1989, for example, this fraction was 31 percent. In 1994, the most recent year for which data are
available, taxpayers with both long- and short-term gains or long- and short-term losses reported
24.7 percent of the dividends reported by taxpayers with gains or losses.
Our discussion so far has not emphasized the role of the limit on the amount of capital
losses deducted from ordinary taxable income. Investors with taxable losses in excess of loss-
offset limits can carry forward losses, indefinitely but without adjustment for inflation, for use in
future years. Because future deductions are worth less than immediate deductions, however,
taxpayers with loss carryforwards face smaller differences between the effective tax rates on
long-term and short-term losses than taxpayers who can deduct the losses against AGI when they
are realized. Tabulations from the Treasury Individual Tax Model show substantial variation
over time in the fraction of dividend income (a proxy for holdings of corporate stock) that is
reported on tax returns with capita! losses in excess of the loss limit. This fraction is never
greater than one third, and is often considerably less.
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These tabulations suggest that a nontrivial share of individual investors had gain and loss
realizations that led them to face different marginal tax rates on short-term and long-term losses.
Our empirical analysis implicitly provides evidence on whether these investors are substantively
important for asset pricing.
II. Data Description
Our empirical tests analyze returns on common stocks that are classified as "ordinary
common shares" on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) return files. Computing a
stock's loss potential requires at least twelve months of previous returns. LOSS, defined as the
percentage difference between its price at the beginning of a time period (say on July 1) and its
price at the end of the period (say on December 30), is used to measure the loss potential of a
stock. We construct LOSS measures for the first and second halves of the calendar year:
(1 a) LOSSJuly-Dec = (PDec 24 /PJuly - 1)
and
(1 b) LOSSjan-June = (PJune 30/PJan 1 - 1).
LOSSJuly-Dec excludes returns on the last five trading days of December, on the grounds that they
may already reflect some of the turn-of-the-year return effects. We set LOSS equal to zero if the
firm experienced a capital gain over the relevant interval. We define a complementary pair of
variables, GAINJuly-Dec and GAINJan-June, for firms that experienced capital appreciation.
The CRSP NYSE and AMEX daily return files begin in July 1962. Since the NASDAQ
files begin in 1973, after some of the tax reforms we consider, we do not analyze returns for
NASDAQ firms. We can obtain beginning-of-1962 prices for NYSE stocks from the monthly
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CRSP file, so we can define LOSS and GAIN and study of turn-of-the-year returns for NYSE
stocks beginning in January 1963. For AMEX stocks, we must begin in 1964.
The turn-of-the-year return is defined following Roll (1983), Sims (1995), and others as
the dividend-inclusive return on the last trading day in December and the first five days in
January. When we exclude the return on the last trading day in December from our analysis, the
results are very similar to those presented below.
Table 2 shows mean and median turn-of-the-year returns for each of the three tax regimes
that we defined above. Turn-of-the-year returns are substantial in all three regimes. The turn-of-
the-year returns are largest for the tax regime that includes 1970-1976 and 1985-86, when the tax
incentives to realize losses while they were short-term were the greatest. The large average turn-
of-the-year effect in this period may also be due in part to the prevalence of accrued losses in this
regime. For the 1970-76 and 1985-86 regime, the median stock experienced a July-December
capital loss 7.4 percent, compared with a capital gain of 0.9 percent in 1963-69 and 1988 tax
regime, and a capital loss of 0.4 percent in the 1979-84 and 1989-96 regime. Using regression
analysis in the next section, we will explore the possible impact of different return experience in
explaining differences in turn-of-the-year returns across regimes.
III. Tax Regimes and Turn-of-the-Year Effects
To investigate how tax law changes affect turn-of-the-year returns, we explore the link
between turn-of-the-year returns and loss realization potential for individual firms. For example,
we estimate:
(2) RJan,i,t = 13*GAINJuly-Dec,i,t-I + 2*GAINJan-June,i,t-I + 03*LOSSJuly-Dec,i,t-1
+ P4*LOSSJan.June,i,t. 1 + s*(I/PRICEit ) + 0i + Xt + El,t.
Rjan,i,t is the turn-of-the-year return defined above. The terms Oi and 1, correspond to firm-
specific and year-specific intercepts. The firm-specific fixed effects capture return differentials
that may be related to volatility, systematic risk, or other slowly changing firm characteristics.
Since GAIN is positive and LOSS is negative, negative values of 33 and P4 imply larger turn-of-
the-year returns on shares with larger losses in the previous year.
PRICE is the price of the stock at the close of the second to last trading day in December.
The variable 1/PRICE serves as a simple proxy for trading costs and the coefficient 35 should
reflect the low-share price effect on turn-of-the-year returns documented by Bhardwaj and
Brooks (1992). Ritter's (1988) parking-the-proceeds hypothesis posits that investors rebalance
their portfolio at the turn-of-the-year, realizing losses in December and disproportionately
reinvesting proceeds in small stocks in early January. This portfolio rebalancing effect may also
be captured by the 1/ PRICE variable.
If tax-loss selling is an important factor in explaining turn-of-the-year returns, then we
should observe a distinct pattern in the coefficients on the loss realization potential variables over
the three tax regimes. This pattern is: (1) !3 P4 < 0 in Regime I, with a six month holding
period and long-term losses 100% deductible; (2) P3 < P4 < 0 in Regime II, with a six month
holding period and long-term losses only 50% deductible; and (3) 33 = 04 <0 in Regime III, with
a twelve month holding period.
We test for differences between the effects of short-term and long-term losses by
including both LOSSJuly-Dec,i,t-I and LOSSjan-June,i,t-l in the regression models. The tax-loss-selling
hypothesis predicts that the difference between the coefficients on the six- and twelve-month
lagged returns should be greatest when there is both a six month holding period and 50%
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deductibility of long-term losses. It also predicts that the difference should be smallest when the
holding period is twelve months, as in Regime III.
3.1 Basic Results
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for each of the three tax regimes.
We report results both with and without firm-specific fixed effects. The table shows that losses
in the previous year predict higher turn-of-the-year returns in each of the three regimes. Gains
during the previous year predict much smaller absolute differences in turn-of-the-year returns.
The coefficients on the lagged losses also differ across the three tax regimes. In particular, the
coefficients are substantially different in Regime II (1970-1976 & 1985-86), the regime with the
greatest incentives for short term loss realization.
The results for Regime II suggest that a 10% capital loss over the July-December period
is associated with a 151 basis point increase in the turn-of-the-year return. A similar loss over
the January-June period is associated with only a 53 basis point increase in turn-of-the-year
returns. One reason returns from the first half of the year would have less of an impact on
January returns when the holding period is six months is that losers from the first half of the year
would have had to have been sold much earlier than year-end to obtain short-term tax treatment.
It is particularly striking that in Regime III, when there is a twelve-month holding period,
the difference in the coefficients on the January-June and the July-December LOSSes is
considerably reduced. Recall, losses on securities purchased during the first as well as the
second half of the year can be realized as a short-term loss at year-end when the holding period is
twelve months. When firm effects are included, this coefficient difference is statistically
insignificant from zero.
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Table 3 reports specifications that relate turn-of-the-year returns to losses and gains over
the previous twelve months. We have also estimated equations with additional lagged returns, in
the spirit of models estimated by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). Including further lagged returns
does not affect the coefficients on the returns over the most recent twelve months. Losses over
the period from 24 to 12 months prior to the turn-of-the-year do have some predictive power for
turn-of-the-year returns. The estimated coefficients are -0.055 (0.009) for Regime I, -0.076
(0.007) for Regime II, and -0.053 (0.014) for Regime III. For the two six month holding period
regimes, the effect of losses 6 to 12 months prior to the turn-of-the-year is not statistically
different from that for losses which occurred 12 to 24 months ago.
Including returns more than twelve months before the realization date also provides an
additional test of the link between the fraction of long-term losses that can be deducted from AGI
and turn-of-the-year returns. In Regime III, when the long-term holding period was twelve
months, the long-term loss deduction fraction was 50% from 1979-1984 and 100% from 1989-
1996. For at least some investors, the incentive to realize a loss within one year of purchase is
greater in the earlier period. To test this, we regressed turn-of-the-year returns on returns from
the previous two years for the two periods. The estimated coefficients on losses over the
previous year were -.070 (.009) for 1979-84 and -.071 (.016) for 1989-96. The effect of losses
that accrued between twelve and twenty-four months before the turn-of-the-year was smaller for
the 1979-84 period than for the latter period. The differences were -.030 (.011) and -.016 (.014),
respectively. Since including returns lagged by more than twelve months does not appear to
affect the coefficients on returns over the six and twelve month lags, the remainder of our
analysis focuses on specifications that exclude further lagged returns.
One difficulty with results like those in Table 3 is that the capital gains tax law was not
the only factor that varied across tax regimes. The early 1970s included a period of poor stock
market returns, so the set of stocks with losses to realize at year-end was larger in this regime
than in the other time periods. Other differences across regimes may be changes in trading costs,
and a growing presence of foreign investors in U.S. equity markets. We provide three "tests" of
whether the different pattern of turn-of-the-year returns is due to the changing distribution of
previous returns, or to the link between past returns and turn-of-the-year returns for stocks with a
given return experience.
First, we re-estimated our equations for Regime II excluding turn-of-the-year returns for
1974 and 1975. The resulting difference between the July-to-December and January-to-June loss
coefficients is -0.094 (0.012). The difference was -0.097 when these years were included in the
sample. Second, we estimate equation (4) for each year to look for differences across tax
regimes. (We cannot estimate firm-specific expected returns in this case.) Table 4 presents
these results. A July-December loss is associated with a significantly greater turn-of-the-year
return relative to a January-June loss in five out of nine years in Regime II, but only two of the
eight years in Regime I and three out of fourteen years in Regime III. These results provide
support for our focus on tax regime differences as a key factor in the changing coefficient
patterns.
Finally, we disaggregated the regressors in equation (2) to include separate variables for
capital losses of less than 20 percent, 20-40 percent, and more than 40 percent. These three
variables add up to the LOSS variable in equation (2), but they provide some evidence on the
pattern of turn-of-the-year effects across stocks with accrued losses of different sizes. Table 5
shows the results of estimating this modified specification. While the fraction of firms in these
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various loss categories changes significantly across tax regimes, the coefficients on losses in
each category move in tandem with the aggregate coefficient for all losses (i.e., the coefficient in
Table 3). Moreover, there are pronounced differences for sets of losses between the January-
June and July-December loss effects when the holding period is six months, but no such
differences when the holding period is one year. This evidence also suggests that the changing
distribution of LOSS does not explain the divergent coefficients on losses that accrue between
July-December and January-June across tax regimes.
3.2 Small Firms
Several previous studies, notably Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Keim (1983), have
suggested that large turn-of-the-year returns are concentrated among stocks with small market
capitalization (although Ackert and Athanassakos (1998) question this conclusion). If small
stocks are more apt to suffer large losses and/or have a higher percentage of individual
ownership, then the small firm premium in January may be partly attributable to tax-loss selling.
To address the relationship between firm size, lagged losses, and turn-of-the-year returns, we
estimate (2) allowing the LOSS coefficients to vary by size deciles.
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. To simplify interpretation, the table presents
only the difference between the coefficients on the July-December and January-June loss
variables (33 - 34 above). The correlation between lagged losses and turn-of-the-year returns is
strongest for small and medium size firms, as would be expected given their higher individual
ownership. For Regime II, July-December losses are a stronger predictor of turn-of-the-year
returns than losses over the first half of the year for eight of the ten size deciles. For Regime I,
the analogous result emerges for three size deciles, and for Regime III, for only one size decile.
3.3 Other Tests for Robustness
We also performed two other tests for the robustness of our findings. In the interest of
brevity, we discuss but do not report the results. More detailed results are available from the
authors on request.
First, we re-estimate (2) with other measures of loss potential. LOSS and GAIN measure
the return over the interval for investors who bought the security at the beginning of the interval.
We also consider two alternative measure of loss potential that incorporates some information on
a stock's price trajectory during each six-month period. The first weights the stock's holding
period returns from each day within the interval to the end of the interval by the trading volume
on the given day. The second incorporates volume-weighted returns over the entire year, but
weights more recent returns more heavily. This allows for the possibility that price declines lead
to more tax-loss-selling pressure when they occur later in the year.
The results using these alternative measures of loss potential are qualitatively similar to
those in Table 3. The impact of July-to-December losses on turn-of-the year returns is greatest
in Regime II, the 1970-1976 & 1985-86 period. The difference between the loss potential from
the first half of the year, and that from the second half of the year, is also greatest for this period.
Second, we considered the role of bid-ask spreads in affecting our results. Keim (1989)
and Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) have suggested that turn-of-the-year return anomalies may
simply be the result of changes in the location of transactions prices within the bid-asked price
range. If trades at the end of the year are more likely to take place at the bid price, because they
are "sell" orders, while trades in the early part of January are more likely to occur at the "ask"
price, because they are buy orders, then part of the turn-of-the-year return could simply be the
result of movement within the bid-ask spread. We investigated this possibility by defining an
alternative turn-of-the-year return measure. CRSP reports low and high prices for the day if the
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stock was traded, and the closing bid and ask quotes if no trades occurred. Trading spreads
provide information about bid-ask spreads. Our alternative return measure is the difference
between the bid (or low) price at the end of the fifth trading day in January, and the ask (or high)
price at the beginning of the last trading day in December.
The estimated coefficients using this return specification are only slightly smaller than
those in Table 3, and the conclusions about the importance of lagged losses and the difference
between recent and further lagged loss effects across the different tax regimes are unaffected by
this redefinition of returns. Apparently, I/PRICE partially controls for the portion of the turn-of-
the-year return that was due to movement within the bid-ask spread.
IV. Conclusion
Our results support the view that tax-related factors affect turn-of-the-year returns. Some
explanations of why lagged returns are related to these turn-of-the-year returns, such as the
institutional "window dressing" hypothesis, would not predict any relationship between the long-
term capital gains holding period for individual investors and the correlation between past
returns and the turn-of-the-year effect. Yet our empirical findings suggest that there is a
substantial relationship in the U.S. equity markets. Our findings are consistent with the
predictions of the tax-loss-selling hypothesis, and they suggest that this hypothesis may have
some part in explaining the turn-of-the-year effect.
Our analysis has not attempted to integrate the role of changing transaction costs for
equity trading in the discussion of tax-loss-selling incentives. The change in the structure of
NYSE commissions in 1975, summarized in Stoll (1979), could have important effects in this
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regard. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the precise change in effective trading costs
facing individual traders at this time, because the costs of different sized trades responded
differently to deregulation. In addition, some of the most important changes, such as the growth
of discount brokers, developed gradually after 1975. The development of derivatives markets
could also have potentially important effects, as could variation over time in average bid-ask
spreads, but we leave these issues for further work.
A related issue that bears further study is the effect of the supply of realizable losses on
the nature of turn-of-the-year effects. There are some years, such as 1974, when the aggregate
market experiences substantial losses and investors are likely to have many unrealized capital
losses in their portfolios. In such years investors may have little need to engage in year-end tax
loss trading, and this may affect the turn-of-year returns. Dhaliwal and Trezevant (1993) find
that the positive'January return to shares that declined during the previous year is larger in down-
market years than in up-market years. Further work on the link between taxation and turn-of-
the-year returns could usefully focus on the nature of individual investor behavior, particularly
the relationship between involuntary gain and loss realizations during the year and voluntary
year-end realizations.
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Table 1: Key Provisions of the Federal Capital Gains Tax, 1942-1996
% of Long-Term
Long-Term Holding Losses Deductible
Years Period (months) Against AGI Loss Limit
1942-1969 6 100 $1000
1970-1976 6 50 $1000
1977 9 50 $2000
1978 - June 1984 12 50 $3000
July 1984-1986 6 50 $3000
1987 6 100 $3000
1988-1996 12 100 $3000
Source: U.S. Treasury Department (1985) and Pechman (1987).
Table 2: Turn-of-the-Year Returns: NYSE and AMEX
Mean and Median Returns Over Various Tax Regimes
Tax "Regime" Regime I Regime II Regime III
Applicable Years 1963-1969, 1970-1976, 1979-1984,
1988 1985-1986 1989-1996
Capital Gains Tax 6 month holding 6 month holding 12 month holding
Rules period, long-term period, long-term period
losses 100% losses 50%
deductible deductible
against AGI against AGI
Median Return 0.020 0.044 0.014
Mean Return 0.033 0.074 0.030
(0.011) (0.017) (0.006)
Source: Authors' tabulations from daily CRSP files. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Standard errors are corrected to account for contemporaneous correlation of returns.
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Table 3: Regression Results Relating Returns on Last Day of December and First Five
Trading Days of January to GAINS and LOSSES in Past Year, NYSE and AMEX Stocks
Explanatory Variable Regime I Regime II Regime III
LOSSjan-June,t-I -0.084 -0.102 -0.053 -0.057 -0.068 -0.069
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
LOSSJuly-Dec,t-I -0.143 -0.167 -0.151 -0.178 -0.086 -0.118
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
GAINJan-June,t-. -0.016 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.008
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
GAINjuly-Dec,t-I -0.017 -0.013 -0.002 -0.011 -0.017 -0.015
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
1/PRICE 0.032 0.060 0.154 0.129 0.051 0.047
(0.032) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.014) (0.013)
Firm Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Diff. in LOSS -0.059 -0.066 -0.097 -0.121 -0.018 -0.049
coefficients (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Adjusted R .384 .277 .430 .373 .317 .268
Sample Size 14,932 20,645 32,701
Notes: Difference in LOSS coefficients is coefficient on LOSSJuly-Dec,t-1 minus coefficient on
LOSSjan-June,t- 1. All equations include year-effects and equations without firm-effects contain an
indicator variable for AMEX stocks. Values in parentheses are White (heteroscedasticity-
consistent) standard errors.
Table 4: Regression Results for Each Year Relating Returns on Last Day of December and
First Five Trading Days of January to GAINS and LOSSES in Past Year, NYSE & AMEX
Cumulative Cumulative Difference Cumulative Cumulative Difference
Loss, Loss, in LOSS Loss, Loss, in LOSS
Year July to Dec. Jan. to June Coefficients Year July to Dec. Jan. to June Coefficients
Regime I Regime III
1963 -0.049 -0.101 0.052 1979 -0.125 -0.107 -0.018
(0.049) (0.013) (0.050) (0.016) (0.035) (0.039)
1964 -0.169 -0.154 -0.016 1980 -0.006 0.013 -0.019
(0.033) (0.057) (0.067) (0.021) (0.042) (0.049)
1965 -0.150 -0.190 0.040 1981* -0.095 -0.012 -0.084
(0.032) (0.030) (0.047) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031)
1966 -0.040 -0.009 -0.031 1982* -0.074 0.066 -0.140
(0.044) (0.026) (0.048) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
1967* -0.235 -0.151 -0.084 1983 -0.147 -0.126 -0.021
(0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.048) (0.013) (0.051)
1968 -0.064 -0.079 0.015 1984 -0.132 -0.113 -0.019
(0.030) (0.057) (0.068) (0.021) (0.084) (0.082)
1969* -0.113 -0.021 -0.091 1989 -0.082 -0.054 -0.029
(0.020) (0.014) (0.026) (0.031) (0.047) (0.059)
1988 -0.158 -0.111 -0.047 1990 -0.180 -0.176 -0.005
(0.014) (0.054) (0.055) (0.039) (0.052) (0.059)
1991* -0.096 -0.036 -0.060
Regi me II (0.019) (0.032) (0.039)
1970* -0.140 -0.050 -0.090 1992 -0.180 -0.116 -0.063
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.078) (0.104) (0.127)
1971 -0.034 0.011 -0.046 1993 0.071 0.009 0.063
(0.036) (0.010) (0.037) (0.070) (0.026) (0.071)
1972* -0.128 -0.056 -0.072 1994 -0.136 -0.107 -0.029
(0.022) (0.042) (0.049) (0.028) (0.018) (0.034)
1973 -0.038 -0.036 -0.002 1995 -0.052 -0.072 0.020
(0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.024)
1974* -0.156 -0.056 -0.100 1996 -0.110 -0.072 -0.038
(0.025) (0.017) (0.031) (0.026) (0.036) (0.041)
1975* -0.264 -0.125 -0.139
(0.023) (0.030) (0.032) "Transition" Years
1976 -0.142 -0.088 -0.053 1977 -0.025 -0.026 0.001
(0.017) (0.094) (0.096) (0.023) (0.049) (0.057)
1985 -0.011 -0.029 0.018 1978 -0.038 -0.014 -0.024
(0.018) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023)
1986* -0.214 -0.056 -0.158 1987 -0.098 -0.061 -0.038
(0.042) (0.035) (0.053) (0.022) (0.027) (0.036)
Notes: Difference in LOSS coefficients is coefficient on LOSSJuly-Dec,t-I minus coefficient on
LOSSjan-June,t-l. Values in parentheses are White (heteroscedasticity-consistent) standard errors.
Coefficients on GAIN measures, 1/PRICE, and indicator for AMEX stocks are not reported.
* indicates that the difference in LOSS coefficients is significantly less than zero at .10 level.
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Table 5: Regressions of Turn-of-Year Returns on Lagged Returns,
NYSE & AMEX Stocks Pooled, Stratified by Lagged Gain or Loss and by Size of Loss
Explanatory Variable Regime I Regime II Regime III
LOSS <20% -0.058 -0.054 -0.083
Jan-June (0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
LOSS <20% -0. 107* -0.079 -0.089
July-Dec (0.016) (0.014) (0.010)
LOSS 20-40% -0.087 -0.065 -0.046
Jan-June (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
LOSS 20-40% -0.112 -0.124* -0.067
July-Dec (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
LOSS >40% -0.089 -0.049 -0.083
Jan-June (0.020) (0.008) (0.020)
LOSS >40% -0.194* -0.163* -0.098
July-Dec (0.026) (0.012) (0.023)
GAIN -0.017 -0.001 0.003
Jan-June (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
GAIN -0.019 -0.011 -0.018
July-Dec (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
1/PRICE 0.028 0.150 0.050
(0.032) (0.019) (0.014)
Adjusted R2  .387 .431 .318
Estimates are similar to those in Table 3 but stratify securities by previous returns. All
estimating equations include firm and year effects. Sample sizes are the same as those in Table
3. * indicates LOSS coefficient for July-Dec is significantly different from analogous
coefficient for Jan-June interval at .05 significance level.
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Table 6: Regression Results for Turn-of-Year Returns, NYSE & AMEX Stocks Pooled,
Difference in LOSS coefficients over Market Capitalization Deciles
Size Decile Regime I Regime II Regime III
sI' (smallest) -0.072 0.012 -0.030
(0.056) (0.036) (0.051)
2"d  -0.058 -0.107* 0.016
(0.047) (0.031) (0.035)
3rd  -0.082* -0.116* -0.040
(0.040) (0.027) (0.030)
4th -0.102* -0.058* 0.003
(0.035) (0.026) (0.036)
5th  -0.059* -0.133* -0.119*
(0.029) (0.022) (0.069)
6th  -0.004 -0.118* 0.025
(0.034) (0.024) (0.022)
7th  0.007 -0.084* 0.049
(0.032) (0.022) (0.024)
8th  0.032 -0.077* 0.057
(0.029) (0.020) (0.021)
9 th 0.019 -0.064* 0.069
(0.027) (0.020) (0.019)
1Oth 0.050 -0.006 0.023
(0.025) (0.022) (0.018)
Adjusted R2  .396 .447 .328
Note: Difference in LOSS coefficients is coefficient on LOSSJuly-Dec,t-I minus coefficient on
LOSSjan-June,t-l. Market capitalization decile cutoffs for January of year t are formed at end of
year t-2. * indicates that the difference in LOSS coefficients is significantly less than zero at .05
level.
